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Abstract
In this paper we study the geometrical properties of the support of the limit distri-
butions of income/wealth in economies with uninsurable individual risk, and how they
are affected by technology and preference parameters and by policy variables. We work
out two simple successive generation models with stochastic human capital accumulation
and with R&D and we prove that intense technological progress makes the support of
the wealth distribution converge to a fractal Cantor-like set. Such limit distribution im-
plies the disappearance of the middle class, with a “gap” between two polarized wealth
clusters that widens as the growth rate becomes higher. Hence, we claim that in a highly
meritocratic world in which the payoff of the successful individuals is high enough, and
in which social mobility is strong, societies tend to look highly “fractalized”. We also
show that a redistribution scheme financed by proportional taxation does not help cure
society’s disconnection/polarization; on the contrary, it might increase it. Finally we
show that these results are not confined to our analytically worked out examples but are
easily extended to a widely used class of macroeconomic and growth models.
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1 Introduction
How do we predict a growing and unequal society’s wealth distribution to look like? In this
paper we show how easily the support of the limit distribution of individual relative wealth
levels can easily look like a peculiar geometric object called a Cantor set: a fractal, that is,
a totally disconnected set with self-similar structure. We construct two variants of a simple
competitive economy with successive generations and uninsurable individual risk in which
a high exogenous growth rate renders the general equilibrium wealth distribution converge
to a support that is a Cantor set. Hence, we argue that a high growth rate is a source of
socioeconomic disconnection.
An emerging phenomenon of income or wealth polarization has been lately observed in
many economies. For some empirical contributions see, for example, Alesina and Rodrik [4],
Perotti [38], Benabou [12], Benhabib and Spiegel [14], Barro [10] and [11], Forbes [26]. From
the theoretical point of view, the literature on income inequality and polarization appears to be
already rich enough, both from the perspective of the possible consequences that polarization
may have on growth rates and from the perspective of analyzing what aspects of growth may
generate inequality and polarization. See, for example, Loury [35], Banerjee and Newmann
[7], Galor and Zeira [27], Alesina and Rodrik [4], Persson and Tabellini [39], Benhabib and
Rustichini [15], Aghion and Bolton [1], Benabou [12], Piketty [40], Aghion, Caroli and Garcia-
Penalosa [3], Benabou [13].
In this paper, economies with (possibly) polarized wealth distribution in the long run are
analyzed by means of a new approach, which makes use of Iterated Function Systems (IFS)
to describe their dynamics and their limit distribution. Such methodology seems to be new in
the literature. Up to our knowledge, only recently very few works appeared focussing on this
type of dynamics with applications to economics, and none of them with the aim to explain
wealth or income inequality. Some examples are Bhattacharya and Majumdar [16], [17], [18],
who deal with IFS with random monotone maps, Montrucchio and Privileggi [37] and Mitra,
Montrucchio and Privileggi [36], who studied stochastic economies converging to invariant
probabilities supported on fractal sets.
Our analysis departs from the whole models on wealth inequality tackled by the authors
cited above, where some imperfections in capital markets are being assumed in order to ob-
tain persistent income or wealth inequality. Our framework is characterized by markets with
a strong mobility engine associated to growth, and it is this strong mobility pattern itself that
generates a fractal societies. Mobility is introduced through stochastic labor income hetero-
geneity, which represents the ability of the individuals to adopt better and better technologies.
If better technologies entail some adoption uncertainty at the individual level and if such risk
is uninsurable, due to the unobservable or unverifiable individual commitment in a learning ef-
fort, income heterogeneity becomes a natural consequence of aggregate growth, and the faster
aggregate growth the relatively stronger the weight of the uncertain part of the individual
resources.
A faster growing environment implies stronger family mobility prospects, because a suc-
cessful individual from a poor family can more easily overtake the unsuccessful individuals of a
richer family, but it means a tendency for the middle class to disappear as well. Hence a ”hole”
in the middle of the support of the wealth distribution is more likely to appear the faster the
pace of technological growth: the wealth distribution becomes ”polarized” in a high and a low
wealth class. However, the random dynamical system that governs the individual assignment
across the ever expanding social wealth distribution is not only polarizing the wealth distribu-
tion, but will mirror the central ”hole” everywhere through the wealth distribution itself: the
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absence of a middle class at the social level implies the absence of ”middle subclasses” at all
levels, due to the diversity of the destinies of the different individuals who travel stochastically
through society’s wealth distribution. It follows that the same individual income stochasticity
that generates a wealth distribution that is disconnected in the middle multiplies such dis-
connection at infinity - in all subintervals of it - generating a totally disconnected support of
the wealth distribution in which no matter how small the interval considered it always lacks
a ”middle class”. Therefore we reach what we can call a ”pulverized” society. Such a ”fractal
society” is an intriguing mix of polarization and pulverization.
This kind of ”polarization/ pulverization” of the aggregate wealth distribution has never
been analyzed by the literature on inequality and growth, and it differs in kind from the
traditional idea of ”polarization”. As a matter of fact, though if we photograph the wealth
distribution at each point in time we get a highly ”polarized” picture, when we track the
processes for the successive wealth levels of any individual we observe a strong mobility.
Hence, dynamically, such societies are not polarized in durable ”classes”, but they show a
tremendous degree of mobility. Indeed it is mobility itself that generates polarization of the
limit wealth distribution. The very fact that the gains of a lucky poor can make her richer
than an unlucky rich is at the same time an important mobility aspect and the generator of
a fractal society.
We will obtain fractalized wealth distributions from two versions of a simple macroeconomic
model with no aggregate uncertainty and individual idiosyncratic income risk. This will deliver
our main results in a very transparent way. We choose specifications to generate enough
linearity in the random dynamical system and immediately translate the dynamics into well
known properties of the Barnsley IFS used to generate the Cantor set.
An exercise that we provide in the paper regards the effect of a fiscal policy aimed at
eliminating polarization/ pulverization through income taxation of those who are successful
and redistribution to the unlucky individuals. Intuitively, since such policy is directly attacking
the social mobility mechanism responsible - through dynamic general equilibrium effects - for
the fractalization of society, one would expect that this would easily reach its target. We
show that this is not the case. In fact, such a redistribution scheme can never eliminate the
polarization/ pulverization of society. What’s more, even if the free workings of the private
economy itself did not imply socioeconomic disconnection, the introduction of taxation of
stochastic incomes of all individuals may be able to generate socioeconomic disconnection and
induce the polarization/ pulverization of society. Also the adoption of a random taxation
scheme, which has in principle the potential of creating an artificial middle class in a polarized
economy, proves essentially ineffective provided that the incentive compatibility constraint is
sufficiently tight.
Finally, we show how easily the framework of generalized IFS may be used to study polar-
ization/ pulverization phenomena in more general economic models, possibly with non-linear
dynamics and state-dependent probabilities. We provide sufficient conditions for polariza-
tion/ pulverization and extend the result on inefficacy of redistributive policies also to the
case of non-linear dynamics. Moreover, an extreme example of a.s. polarization due to
state-dependent probabilities, and independent of the (possibly non fractal) properties of the
attractor of the system, is presented. In a future paper we shall present a full characteriza-
tion of neoclassical models with infinitely lived agents exhibiting polarization/ pulverization
features.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we briefly review some of the basic math-
ematical methods we use to analyze the possibly fractal support of the limit distribution for
a random dynamical system. A brief survey on the main results available from the IFS lit-
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erature pertaining the linear (affine maps) case will be reported. The discussion will proceed
at a simple illustrative level, while the reader will be referred to the literature for rigorous
proofs and extensions. We will make use of diagrams to focus on the intuition about aspects
that might be interesting for other potential economic applications. In Sections 3 and 4 we
apply the methodology to two simple successive generation models of technological adoption
and will describe the conditions necessary and sufficient for the limit distribution to admit
a Cantor support. We will perform comparative statics exercises obtaining our main impli-
cations for the link between inequality and growth and the inefficacy of fractal-eliminating
policies. Section 5 is devoted to a closer examination of the interplay between a more refined
definition of polarization, in the spirit of Esteban and Ray [23], and what we have somewhat
tentatively called "pulverization". Our conclusion is that a fractal society is compatible with
(a deeper notion of) polarization also in the long run, i.e., pulverization must not necessar-
ily thwart polarization of the invariant distribution. Section 6 deals with non-linear IFS, to
which the results on polarization/pulverization obtained for the previous models are substan-
tially extended and translated into properties of generalized Cantor sets. The aim here is
to show how an approach based on Iterated Function Systems may be helpful in exploring
some particular aspects of dynamics in economics, like wealth polarization, usually hardly
grasped by the traditional analysis. Finally, in Section 7 we shortly recall some facts on IFS
with state-dependent probabilities which illustrate that, even in this setting, essentially our
results remain unchanged under standard assumptions. A pathological counterexample of a
(with probability 1) totally polarized economy is discussed, mainly to illustrate the role of the
conditions imposed on the probability function. Section 8 concludes with some comments.
2 Some Mathematical Preliminaries
Since we shall study several variants of the same random system, here we describe general re-
sults pertaining to a class of contractive random dynamical systems that can be all normalized
so that its possible values converge to some compact subset of the interval [0, 1].
Consider the linear random dynamical system
wt = αwt−1 + z (1)
where 0 < α < 1, z is a random variable taking one of the two values z1 and z2 with fixed
probabilities 1−p and p respectively, 0 < p < 1, for all t ≥ 1, and w0 ∈ R. System (1) belongs
to a larger family known in the literature as (Hyperbolic) Iterated Function Systems and can
be expressively rewritten as
wt =
½
αwt−1 + z1 with probability 1− p
αwt−1 + z2 with probability p
(2)
Proposition 1 Suppose that z1 < z2. Then system (2), is similar to the system
yt =
½
αyt−1 with probability 1− p
αyt−1 + (1− α) with probability p
(3)
which has the interval [0, 1] as trapping region. The (similar) map that converts (2) into (3)
is given by
yt =
1− α
z2 − z1
wt −
z1
z2 − z1
(4)
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Proof. Direct application of (4) to system (2).
In Section 6.1 it will be shown that such normalization to the interval [0, 1] is possible
for any Iterated Function System with maps not necessarily linear and not necessarily in-
creasing. System (3) can be actually obtained from system (2) by a direct application of
formula (44) discussed there. In Section 6.1 it will be also argued that the analysis on po-
larization/pulverization carried out in the following sections can be easily generalized to a
non-linear environment.
The concept of similarity used here means that there exist a transformation S : R→ R such
that |S(x)− S(y)| = c |x− y| for some constant c and all x, y ∈ R. A similarity transforms sets
into geometrically similar ones, in the sense that preserves relative distances between points
of the original set. This is peculiar in our analysis because similarities preserve the main
features of the attractor of system (2), which, as we shall see, is the subset of the trapping
region (to which the system eventually converges) that exhibits the polarization properties of
the economy we want to discuss.
0
g
g
y
y
1
2
1
t+1
1
t
Figure 1: the interval [0, 1] is the trapping region of system (3), where g1(y) = αy + (1− α) and
g2(y) = αy.
Figure 1 illustrate why interval [0, 1] is the trapping region of the contractive system (3): 0
is the fixed point of the map g1(y) = αy and 1 is the fixed point of the map g2(y) = αy+(1− α);
since, at each period, the system ”jumps” from one map to the other with probabilities 1− p
and p respectively, it must eventually remain ”trapped” between 0 and 1.
Proposition 1 has an important consequence that will provide our results on ineffectiveness
of redistributive policies in the following sections: the similarity between systems (2) and (3)
implies that the geometrical properties of the former depend only on the contraction factor α,
and not on the additive constants z1 and z2. Thus, any modification of z1 and z2 will have,
through (4), only a ”re-scaling effect” on the dynamics, without affecting the normalized
system (3). More general results extended to non-linear Lipschitz maps are further discussed
in Section 6.3.
We now recall some well known facts on Iterated Function System (3).
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2.1 Iterated Function Systems
There is a huge literature available on Iterated Function Systems, which has grown very fast
since, a few decades ago, it proved useful in techniques for generating approximated images
of fractals on computer screens. Exhaustive treatment can be found, among others, in [30],
[8], [21], [24], [50], [44], [33] and [25]. For a simplified exposition, focused on discussing an
optimal growth model exhibiting the same dynamics as in (3), see also [36]. Here we shall
contain ourselves by providing only the notions strictly necessary for our analysis.
For a given 0 < α < 1, define the maps from [0, 1] to [0, 1] by½
g1(y) = αy
g2(y) = αy + (1− α)
(5)
Then {g1, g2, p} is a (contractive) Iterated Function System (IFS) over the interval [0, 1]; it
summarizes the dynamics expressed in (3), whose asymptotic behavior is the focus of the
present subsection. System (5) induces an operator T on R, called Barnsley operator, defined
by
T (B) = g1(B) ∪ g2(B), B ⊂ R, (6)
where gj(B) denotes the image of the set B through gj, j = 1, 2. Successive iterations of T
transform the original set B ⊂ R into a sequence of sets Bt = T [T t−1(B)] through time. We
are interested in properties of the limiting set, if it exists, to which the sequence Bt might
eventually converge. A set A ⊂ R is called an invariant set or attractor for (5) if it is compact
and satisfies
T (A) = A.
It is a set such that, once entered by the IFS, successive iterations of T keep the system inside
it.
Since (3) describes a stochastic dynamical system, another important aspect of the IFS is
the evolution through time of marginal probability distributions. Given any initial distribution
µ0 over R, it is interesting to study how this probability evolves following the IFS. Let B be
the σ-algebra of Borel measurable subsets of R and P the space of probability measures on
(R,B). Define the Markov operator M : P → P as
Mµ (B) = (1− p)µ
£
g−11 (B)
¤
+ pµ
£
g−12 (B)
¤
, for all B ∈ B (7)
where µ ∈ P and g−1j (B) denotes the set {x ∈ R : gj(x) ∈ B}, j = 1, 2. Operator M is often
called Foias operator. As we did for operator T , we want to study successive iterations of M
starting from some initial probability µ0: µt (B) =M [M t−1µ0 (B)], which yields the evolution
of marginal probabilities of the system as time elapses. A probability distribution µ∗ ∈ P is
said to be invariant with respect to M if
µ∗ =Mµ∗. (8)
An invariant probability distribution is usually interpreted in economics as the stochastic
steady state to which the economy eventually might converge starting from some initial dis-
tribution µ0 (see for example [48] and [37]).
Here is the main result available on the ”fixed point” of our IFS. Recall that the support
of a probability distribution µ is the smallest closed set S such that µ (S) = 1, and that a
sequence µt of probabilities converges weakly to µ∗ if limt→∞
R
fdµt =
R
fdµ∗ for every bounded
continuous function f : R→ R.
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Theorem 1 Consider the IFS described by {g1, g2, p}.
i) There is a unique attractor for the IFS; that is, a unique compact set A ⊆ [0, 1], such that
g1(A) ∪ g2(A) = A.
ii) There is a unique probability distribution µ∗ on ([0, 1] ,B ([0, 1])) satisfying the functional
equation (8), that is,
µ∗(B) = (1− p)µ∗
£
g−11 (B)
¤
+ pµ∗
£
g−12 (B)
¤
for all B ∈ B ([0, 1]) . (9)
iii) A is the support of µ∗ and, for any probability1 µ0 on ([0, 1] ,B ([0, 1])), the sequence
µt =M tµ0 for t = 0, 1, 2, . . ., converges weakly to µ∗.
The original proof dates back to Hutchinson [30]. See also Falconer [24], Lasota andMackey
[33] and Mitra, Montrucchio and Privileggi [36] for further discussion.
Theorem 1 and the definition of weak convergence immediately provides some information
on the limiting distribution, which will be useful later. Denote by y∗ ∈ [0, 1] the random
variable associated to the invariant distribution µ∗, that is, y∗ is the random fixed point2 of
system (3). Then, functional equation (9) can be rewritten as
µ∗(y∗ ∈ B) = (1− p)µ∗
µ
y∗
α ∈ B
¶
+ pµ∗
µ
y∗
α −
1− α
α ∈ B
¶
,
which allows for a direct computation of expectation and variance of y∗:
E(y∗) = p (10)
V ar(y∗) = 1− α
1 + αp (1− p) . (11)
Note that these computations are justified thanks to weak convergence, since expectation
and variance are the integrals of the identity function f(y) = y and the function f(y) =
(y − Eg(y))2 respectively, which are both bounded and continuous over [0, 1].
2.2 The Support of the Limiting Distribution
It is important to recall here some features of the support A of the invariant distribution (the
attractor of system (5)) which depend only on contraction factor α of the IFS {g1, g2, p} and
are independent of p. This will be the key ingredient in explaining polarization phenomena in
the following sections.
A quick glance at Figure 1 makes clear that the support of our IFS will be the whole
interval [0, 1] whenever 1/2 ≤ α < 1. This is because T ([0, 1]) = g1([0, 1]) ∪ g2([0, 1]) = [0, 1]
if the images of g1 and g2 overlap, that is, if 1/2 ≤ α < 1, as Figure 2 shows. In this case we
shall say that the distribution has ”full support”.
More interesting is the case when images g1([0, 1]) and g2([0, 1]) do not overlap: this hap-
pens for 0 < α < 1/2, since g1([0, 1]) ∪ g2([0, 1]) = [0, α] ∪ [1− α, 1]. As α < 1/2, there is a
”gap” between the two image sets, with amplitude h (α) equals to
h (α) = 1− 2α > 0. (12)
1To be precise, weak convergence holds for any initial probability µ such that
R |x− a| dµ < ∞ for some
constant a. See Section 2.1.2 in [36] for more details.
2See Arnold [6] for a detailed treatment of random dynamical systems and random fixed points.
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Note that this amplitude is a decreasing function of α, the common slope of g1 and g2. More-
over, this gap will ”spread” through the unit interval by successive applications of the maps
(5), reproducing itself, scaled down by a factor 1/α, in the middle of each subinterval born
after each step t. Figure 3 reproduces the first 3 iterations of (5) starting from [0, 1], obtaining
a union of 8 (= 23) intervals of length α3.
0
y
y
g
g
1
2
1
t+1
1
t
Figure 2: g1([0, 1]) ∪ g2([0, 1]) = [0, 1] when 1/2 ≤ α < 1.
By pushing these iterations to the limit, we eventually find an attractor with features of
the usual Cantor ternary set; in fact, for α = 1/3, the support is precisely the Cantor ternary
set. Cantor-like sets of the kind constructed by computing limt→∞ T t ([0, 1]) for 0 < α < 1/2
exhibit several geometrical properties that are typical of fractals.
The most bewildering - and intriguing - feature of fractals is the need of a more sophisti-
cated tool than the topological dimension - which allows only for integer values - to measure
the ”consistency” of their structure. Several dimensions has been constructed for this purpose,
like, among others, the Hausdorff dimension, the Box-counting dimension and the Similarity
dimension. These dimensions consider the infimum partition made up of some ”regular sets”
(like balls or squares) that contains the fractal, and measure how fast the number of sets in
the partition grows as finer and finer partitions are applied (for a discussion on dimensions
see, for example, [24]). All fractals have the peculiarity that their dimension is a ”fraction”,
from which the name ”fractal”; for instance, Cantor-like sets which are the attractors of IFS
(5), for 0 < α < 1/2, have Hausdorff dimension − ln 2/ lnα, which, in this case, is the same
as the Box-counting and the Similarity dimensions.
Since α < 1/2, the attractors we are studying have all dimension less than 1, which implies
that they are totally disconnected, that is, between any two points in them, there are ”holes”
(points laying outside the attractor). To see this, note that if a Cantor-like set were containing
some interval, its dimension3 would be 1. Conversely, even if dimensions less than 1 denote
sets with very ”disperse” points, by means of a standard Cantor diagonal argument, it can
3This follows also from the fact that the topological dimension is not larger than the Hausdorff dimension.
For a proof of this property see Theorem 6.2.9 in [21].
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be easily shown that Cantor-like sets contain uncountably many points. In other words, our
attractor has the same number of points as the whole interval [0, 1], but they are all pulverized
across the interval itself (in the mathematical literature it is often referred as “Cantor dust”).
However none of these points are isolated. Hence, since it is a closed set, any Cantor-like set
is compact, perfect and totally disconnected. A terse and accessible discussion of the Cantor
ternary set and its properties can be found in Chapter 11 in [49]. Also [19] is a good reference
for an introductory approach.
g
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y
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g
0
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y
y
g
g
0
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3
1
2
Figure 3: first 3 iterations of our IFS for α < 1/2 starting from [0, 1]. The third iteration gives a
union of 8 intarvals of length α3, as can be seen on the vertical axis of the last figure.
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2.3 The Invariant Distribution
Properties of the attractor discussed before shed some light also on the limiting distribution
defined over the attractor itself. As a matter of fact, a set A ⊂ R with Hausdorff dimension
less than 1 have Lebesgue measure zero4. This can be also shown through a direct argu-
ment following the construction in Figure 3: the Lebesgue measure of T ([0, 1]) is 2α, that
of T 2 ([0, 1]) is 22α2 and that of T 3 ([0, 1]) is 23α3. By induction, it is immediately seen that
T t ([0, 1]) consists of 2t intervals of Lebesgue measure (length) αt, so that its Lebesgue measure
2tαt → 0 as t → ∞. Since A = limt→∞ T t ([0, 1]) is the support of the invariant distribution
µ∗, µ∗ (A) = 1, from which follows that µ∗ turns out to be singular with respect to Lebesgue
measure.
More results on singularity versus absolute continuity of µ∗ are available and are widely
discussed in [36]. Here we briefly recall some of them.
First, for all values of parameters α and p, the invariant distribution is of the ”pure” type,
i.e., it is either singular or absolutely continuous on its whole support.
Secondly, it is highly sensitive with respect to changes in the one-period probability p.
In fact, when 0 < α < 1/2, two invariant distributions generated by probabilities p and p0
respectively, are mutually singular. This means that measures with the same support A (which
depends on α and not on p) concentrate over subsets of A with empty intersection for different
probabilities p and p0.
Moreover, µ∗ can be singular also for values α ≥ 1/2, i.e. when images of g1 and g2 overlap.
In particular, this happens for values of probability p bounded away from 1/2 (i.e., when p
is close enough to 0 or 1). However, also for p = 1/2, some examples of singularity for some
special values of α exist; Erdös [22] constructed some of them. These results, widely surveyed
in [36], show that even if µ∗ has the whole interval [0, 1] as its support, it may be concentrated
over a subset of [0, 1] with zero Lebesgue measure.
To have a flavor of what such an invariant distribution might look like, one may draw some
iterations of Foias operator M defined as in (7) starting from the uniform distribution over
[0, 1]. This, in the case 0 < α < 1/2, is equivalent to the following construction. Split a unit
mass so that the right interval of T ([0, 1]) has mass p and the left interval has mass 1 − p.
Then, divide the mass on each interval of T ([0, 1]) between the two subintervals of T 2 ([0, 1])
in the ratio p : 1− p. Continue in this way, so that the mass on each interval of T t ([0, 1]) is
divided in the ratio p : 1−p between its two subintervals in T t+1 ([0, 1]) (see also Example 17.1
in [24]). Figure 4 depicts some iterations of M using the construction of the Cantor ternary
set (α = 1/3) starting from the uniform distribution for p = 1/3.
Figure 5 shows two examples of 8 iterations ofM in the overlapping case, i.e. for values of
α ≥ 1/2, when the invariant distribution µ∗ has full support. Note that for values of α close to
1 (high ”degree of overlapping” of the images g1 ([0, 1]) and g2 ([0, 1])) and p sufficiently close
to 1/2, as in case (a), the figure suggests that µ∗ will be ”smooth” (absolutely continuous);
while, whenever α gets closer to 1/2 and p gets closer to the extrema 0 or 1, as in case (b),
the approximation resembles the traits observed in the last approximations of Figure 4, where
the limiting distribution is known to be singular.
4A rigorous proof of this fact, which uses the notion of Hausdorff measure, can be found in [21].
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Figure 4: first 6 iterations of Foias operator starting from the uniform probability for α = 1/3 and
p = 1/3.
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a) α = 4/5 and p = 1/3;
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b) α = 3/5 and p = 1/8.
Figure 5: two examples of the first 8 iterations of Foias operator starting from the uniform probability
in the overlapping case, that is, for values α ≥ 1/2.
3 Adoption of New Technologies
In this section and in the next one we will apply the previously described methodology to a
couple of models with inequality and growth. Here we assume a sequence of successive gener-
ations of altruistic individuals who take a consumption and bequest decision on their wealth
accumulated out of a stochastic income acquired at the utility cost of learning a technology
that is new at every generation. It may be interpreted as a simple macroeconomic model of
technological adoption of exogenously arriving General Purpose Technologies.
Consider an infinite horizon discrete time economy with a continuum of infinitely lived
families that will be indexed by i. With no loss of generality we shall normalize population
over the unit interval, i.e., i ∈ [0, 1]. Each family is formed by a one-period lived altruistic
individuals whose preferences are represented by the following ”warm glow” (see Andreoni [5])
utility function
u(c, b, e) = c1−βbβ − e
where c > 0 denotes end-of-life consumption, b > 0 the bequest left to the unique heir, e ≥ 0
a learning effort5, and 0 < β < 1 the degree of intergenerational altruism. As, for example, in
Banerjee and Newman [7], Galor and Zeira [27], or Piketty [40], such Cobb-Douglas altruistic
preferences imply that a fraction β of each individual’s end of life wealth will be passed over to
her child. Hence, the indirect utility of end-of-life wealthW is linear (risk neutral preferences)
and equal to
U (W ) = (1− β)1−β ββW − e.
The end-of-life wealth W of each family is uncertain at the beginning of each generation:
it depends on the wealth level inherited from the past, that is on the bequest left by the
ancestor, and on individual success in learning the technology that become available during
her lifetime.
5As will become clear later, each agent chooses to exert effort e between two values: zero and a strictly
positive fixed amount which depends on time.
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Individuals of generation t are endowed with one unit of labor time which they will in-
elastically use to produce a perishable consumption good at the common productivity level
At > 0. At the beginning of period t, a new General Purpose Technology (see Helpman [28])
appears exogenously and every individual has to learn it in order to successfully enter pro-
duction. Learning technology At requires an effort that entails a certain utility cost et > 0.
Whether an individual exerts the required effort for learning such technology is something that
cannot be observed by anybody but the individual6. Moreover ”success” in the adoption of
the technology is not sure, but it occurs to each individual with probability 0 < p < 1 constant
through time, independently of all other individuals. Since the (exertion of) learning effort
is unobservable, borrower-creditor interaction lasts one period only and individual’s offspring
cannot be sanctioned no idiosyncratic risk can be insured.
Technology is assumed to evolve exogenously: At = γAt−1, where γ > 1. Consistently, we
will assume that et = γet−1, that is, learning a more advanced technology requires more effort.
Provided that individual i ∈ [0, 1] alive in period t undertakes the learning effort et at the
beginning of her life, her end-of-period income Yt will be:
Y it =
½
0 with probability 1− p
At with probability p
Notice that in this model income derives from the ”ability” in the use of current technologies
and entails no utility loss.
3.1 The Wealth Distribution Dynamics
The evolution of technology yields At = γtA0 and that of effort et = γte0, with both A0 and
e0 strictly positive. Individual i wealth at the beginning of her life in period t is given by the
bequest inherited from period t− 1:
bit = βW it−1,
where W it−1 represents the wealth accumulated by her ancestor at the end of time t − 1.
Provided that individual i will perform effort et in order to learn technology At, her expected
indirect utility conditional to the past wealth and the performed effort is given by
E
£
U (W it ) |
¡
W it−1, et
¢¤
= (1− β)1−β ββE
£
W it |W it−1
¤
− et
= (1− β)1−β ββ
£
p
¡
βW it−1 + At
¢
+ (1− p)βW it−1
¤
− et
= (1− β)1−β ββ
¡
βW it−1 + pAt
¢
− et
(13)
where the probability of success p in adopting technology At does not depend on time. We
shall assume the following.
A. 1
0 < e0 < (1− β)1−β ββpA0.
Assumption A.1 implies that the expected indirect utility obtained by exerting effort et
is greater than the certain effort for all t ≥ 0, thus rational individuals will always put the
required effort into learning the new technology. It follows that the intergenerational motion
of the wealth of family i ∈ [0, 1] is described by
W it =
½
βW it−1 with probability 1− p
βW it−1 + At with probability p.
(14)
6Specifically, it is not the amount of learning effort which is not observable, but whether an individual
undertakes such effort at all.
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To fix ideas, assume, for now, that the ”original” bequest available at the beginning of period
t = 0 is zero, that is,
W i0 =
½
0 with probability 1− p
A0 with probability p
Since At grows exogenously through time, the random dynamical system (14) described by
the two maps f1 (W ) = βW and f2 (W ) = βW + At evolves along increasing sets of possible
wealths. In particular, at the end of period t generation i will be endowed with some wealth
W it in the interval "
0 ,
Ã
1− (β/γ)t+1
γ − β
!
γt+1A0
#
(15)
which, since γ > 1, 0 < β < 1 and A0 > 0, diverges to the interval [0,+∞] as t→ +∞.
However, notice that, since 0 < β < 1, both f1 and f2 in (14) are contractions in the
variable W , that is, wealth grows only thanks to technological parameter At as time elapses.
This allows a better highlighting of the features of this dynamics by transforming system (14)
into an equivalent law of motion adjusted by the productivity level At, which turns out to be
contractive and thus having some compact set as trapping region. In other words, (14) can be
transformed into a system of the type of (2), so that the analysis of Section 2 can be directly
applied.
Dividing (14) by At we get the equivalent system in terms of wit = W it /At:
wit =
½
(β/γ)wit−1 with probability 1− p
(β/γ)wit−1 + 1 with probability p
(16)
whose trapping region is the interval
£
0, (1− (β/γ))−1
¤
. In view of Proposition 1, let
α = βγ , (17)
which implies 0 < α < 1, and consider the transformation yit = (1− α)wit of (16). Hence we
obtain the following productivity-adjusted normalized dynamic conjugate to (14):
yit =
½
αyit−1 with probability 1− p
αyit−1 + (1− α) with probability p
(18)
which has the same general form as in (3). Hence, Theorem 1 applied to process (18) guarantees
that the productivity-adjusted normalized dynamic of wealths in our model converges weakly
to some unique distribution µ∗ with support in [0, 1].
3.2 Growth and Fractalization
The stochastic dynamic model expressed by (18), or more generally by (3) in Section 2, turns
out to be especially useful for a slightly different interpretation, which is the main focus of
this paper. One-period probability p of individual i of successfully adopting technology At
at the end of period t, can be seen, by the law of large numbers, as the ”average proportion
of the whole population” that in the long run is eventually able to catch the opportunity of
benefitting from the new technology. In this scenario, in its steady state our economy tends
to grow at a constant exogenous rate γ − 1, with social mobility due to uninsurable success
15
and failure to exploit new technologies making each individual family travel over time across
a constant distribution of relative wealths.
From this aggregate perspective, expectation (10) can be read as the aggregate productivity-
adjusted wealth in the steady state, and variance (11) as the dispersion of individual wealths.
From both expressions (10) and (11) it is immediately seen that the higher the individual
probability p of exploiting technology At, the ”richer” the economy on average, and the lower
parameter α = β/γ (i.e., the lower the altruism rate β or the higher the exogenous growth rate
γ), or the more parameter p is bounded away from 1/2, the more the invariant distribution
µ∗ is concentrated around its mean.
However, in view of Section 2, we are in the position of saying much more on the steady
state of such kind of economy. Specifically, we are interested in the possibility that it may be
more or less polarized, that is, we are interested in the existence of a strong ”middle class”,
which is often considered important for growth itself, for democracy, for sociopolitical stability,
and for the law and order, as quantified, among others, in the empirical analyses of Alesina
and Rodrik [4], Perotti [38] and Barro [10].
A strong ”middle class” in this economy is represented by an invariant distribution that
gathers a proportionally larger fraction of the population around 1/2 than close to the ex-
trema 0 and 1 of the interval [0, 1]. Viceversa, we will call ”polarized/ pulverized” a limiting
distribution with Cantor-like support. Notice that the absence of a middle class is a neces-
sary condition for the latter distribution, and in this sense we refer to polarization. However,
the fractal nature of such support, that is its self-similar structure that infinitely replicates a
”hole”, creates a form of social disconnection that has not been studied in the existing theo-
retical and empirical literature on polarization, and that we somewhat tentatively will label
pulverization.
The following result is an immediate consequence of the discussion in Section 2.2.
Proposition 2 Under A.1, if 1 < γ ≤ 2β, there exists a middle class. Whenever γ > 2β
the economy becomes polarized/ pulverized in the long run, and the support A of its limit
distribution µ∗ is a Cantor-like set. Moreover, the larger γ (and the smaller β), the larger the
gap between the fractions of the population near the extremes of the support.
Proof. Apply (17) and (12) to system (18).
The previous proposition shows that a high economic growth rate, by rewarding the suc-
cessful individuals and penalizing in relative terms those who are not ready to catch the
opportunities associated with the new technologies, make the middle class disappear and po-
larize society in two very different wealth classes. Polarization becomes dramatic the larger the
jump in productivity γ and the smaller the individual degree of altruism β (or, equivalently,
the more selfish the individuals).
It is important to note that polarized wealth distribution does not mean that wealth classes
are trapping the individuals: these become rich and poor in this economy and it is precisely
the amplitude of the social mobility - and not the frequency, that is the individual probability
p of catching the technological opportunity - that generates wealth polarization.
3.3 Redistribution and Social Cohesion
In this section we will show that any redistribution scheme aimed at doing away with social
polarization/ pulverization is not capable of achieving its goal. By applying results from
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Section 2, we shall see that lump-sum transfers from the rich generations to the poor do not
have any effect on the polarization/ pulverization features of our economy. In fact, the ”hole”
that generates a ”fractal society” depends only on parameters β (preferences) and γ (growth
rate). We will not assume that polarization/ pulverization implies productivity losses, though
it would be natural to motivate such political need for more socioeconomic cohesion.
Let us assume that the gains from success are taxed at the end of each period a proportion
0 ≤ τ < 1 and that proceeds are redistributed lump-sum to the unluckies7. If all individuals
exert effort et in order to learn technology At, the steady state proportion of rich families in
the economy will still be p. Hence, the government in the long run will be able to collect
tax revenues equals to pτAt, which - assuming a balanced government budget every period -
equals the aggregate lump sum transfer received at the end of period t by the whole poor.
Since taxation further reduces the expected benefit derived from having the opportunity
of adopting technology At, in order to let all individuals keep putting effort et even under
taxation and thus obtain a dynamic similar to that in (14), an upper bound on tax rate τ is
needed. Let us discuss in detail how Assumption A.1 needs to be modified to avoid free riding
behavior due to the possibility of receiving, out of nothing, a transfer that generates a higher
utility than the expected utility gain produced by putting effort et.
Let 0 ≤ l ≤ 1 denote the fraction of the population who decides to put effort et in learning
technology At. Then, at the steady state, the total amount of tax revenues is plτAt, and each
non-successful individual i - which are both the unlucky ones who exerted effort et and the
lazy ones who did not exert any effort, that amount to a proportion 1−pl of families - receives
a transfer given by
T it =
pl
1− plτAt. (19)
In view of (13), the individual i expected utility gain conditional to effort et is given by
E
£
U
¡
Y it
¢ |et¤ = ρ £p (1− τ )At + (1− p)T it ¤− et
= ρ
·
p (1− τ )At + (1− p)
pl
1− pl τAt
¸
− et,
where ρ = (1− β)1−β ββ, while the individual i certain utility gain obtained by exerting zero
effort is given by
U
¡
T it
¢
= ρ pl
1− plτAt.
In order to let all the families put the effort et = γte0 required to learn technology At, we
need
E
£
U
¡
Y it
¢ |et¤ > U ¡T it ¢
to hold for all 0 ≤ l ≤ 1, which leads toµ
1− τ
1− pl
¶
pρA0 > e0.
Since the minimum of the left hand side is reached for l = 1, then, for each given e0 satisfying
A.1, the following restriction on parameter τ guarantees that all families will always put effort
et in learning technology At also under government taxation.
7Assuming lumps sum redistribution to all individuals - not only to the unluckies - would not alter the
qualitative results of our analysis, as it will become clear later. See also Appendix 6.3.
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A. 2 Assumption A.1 holds and
0 ≤ τ < (1− p)
µ
1− e0pρA0
¶
, (20)
where ρ = (1− β)1−β ββ.
Hence, in view of (14), the dynamics of individual i wealth becomes:
W it =
½
βW it−1 + p (1− p)
−1 τAt with probability 1− p
βW it−1 + (1− τ )At with probability p,
(21)
where, in the first line, p (1− p)−1 τAt represents the transfer received by a single unlucky
family, i.e., T it in (19), with l = 1.
Here is the main result of this section.
Proposition 3 If γ > 2β, polarization/ pulverization never disappears for all income tax
rates τ satisfying A.2.
Proof. Divide both equations in (21) by At to get the productivity-adjusted dynamic
wit =
½
(β/γ)wit−1 + p (1− p)
−1 τ with probability 1− p
(β/γ)wit−1 + (1− τ) with probability p.
(22)
Since A.1 holds, the right hand side in (20) implies τ < 1 − p, which, in turn, implies
p (1− p)−1 τ < (1− τ). Therefore, under A.2, Proposition 1 holds, and thus system (22)
is similar to system (18). Hence, Proposition 2 applies and polarization/ pulverization is
completely determined by condition γ > 2β.
The comments following Corollary 1 in Section 6.3 provide a geometrical interpretation of
this result: only the slopes of the two maps constituting the IFS affect polarization/ pulver-
ization; constants have no effect in shaping the attractor.
There is, however, a main difference with respect to the previous section, which is not
evident from the normalization provided by Proposition 1. Observing the evolution through
time of the feasible sets of both systems (21) or (22), it is immediately clear that, while zero
was included in all supports of the marginal distributions of the model in Section 3.2, the
standard of living of the poor under wealth redistribution will be bounded away from zero in
the long run, that is, nobody will end up with a zero wealth in the steady state. As a matter
of fact, the feasible wealths of system (21) at time t lay in some subset of the interval"Ã
1− (β/γ)t+1
γ − β
!
γt+1p (1− p)−1 τA0 ,
Ã
1− (β/γ)t+1
γ − β
!
γt+1 (1− τ )A0
#
,
with lower extremum strictly positive and increasing over time. Therefore, although gov-
ernment redistribution does not affect polarization/ pulverization, it still proves effective in
sustaining the wealth of the poor. Clearly also the "rich side" of the population is being af-
fected by having a reduced - by factor 1− τ - maximum possible wealth compared to that of
the original feasible region (15). Thus, the overall effect of a redistributive policy by the gov-
ernment is to narrow the whole absolute wealth around its mean, without changing possible
polarization/ pulverization phenomena in relative terms.
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Policy inefficacy of income tax in eliminating polarization/ pulverization is a counterintu-
itive result. However we can prove an even stronger result by introducing capital taxation (not
redistributed lump-sum). As a matter of fact, if final wealth is taxed at a rate 0 < τw < 1,
the dynamical system for productivity adjusted wealth becomes:
wit =
½
(1− τw) (β/γ)wit−1 with probability 1− p
(1− τw) (β/γ)wit−1 + (1− τw) with probability p
which implies the following result, as can be easily established through the same techniques
used before.
Proposition 4 Suppose A.1 holds and 0 < τw < 1 − (pρA0)−1 e0. Then, if γ > (1− τw)2β,
polarization/ pulverization emerges.
In this case, government intervention proves effective (for the worse) in modifying polar-
ization/ pulverization as it is capable of affecting the slope of the maps of the IFS (16) - and
so of the IFS (18) - rather than additive constants (see Section 6.3).
As a result of the last proposition, a high enough wealth tax rate can generate a fractal
wealth distribution even if γ < 2β, that is, even if growth and altruism are such that that the
private sector let alone does not generate social disconnection.
Notice that here, to isolate the pure effect of taxation, we have not assumed any transfer
from the government. However, Proposition 3 states that any lump sum transfer would not
affect the results of the previous proposition, for fractalization only depends on the slope of
the maps f1 and f2 in system (14), and not on their additive constants. Thus, we can say
that, somewhat paradoxically, in this model the middle class may disappear and the economy
become polarized/ pulverized as a result of an active redistributive policy.
3.4 Random Taxation
We here show that a redistribution scheme based on random taxation may reduce and, in
some cases, even eliminate polarization. The idea is to increase the uncertainty in the model
so that the two-maps IFS (21) is replaced by a three-maps IFS in which the image set of the
second map might fill the hole left by the other two images set in case of polarization.
Let us assume that the gains from success are taxed at some rate 0 < τ < 1 with probability
1 − q, with 0 < q < 1. At each period, the successful individuals face a tax lottery such
that they have to pay τAt with probability 1 − q and 0 with probability q. Probability q is
constant through time and is independent of the probability of success p. The government
controls parameters q and τ . The total amount of proceeds are redistributed lump-sum to the
unluckies.
If all individuals exert effort et in order to learn technology At, the steady state proportion
of rich families in the economy will still be p. A fraction q of this proportion will be tax
exempt, while the other fraction 1− q will be taxed at rate τ . Hence, the government in the
long run will be able to collect tax revenues equals to
p (1− q) τAt,
which - assuming a balanced government budget every period - equals the aggregate lump
sum transfer received at the end of period t by the whole poor.
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The dynamics of individual i wealth becomes:
W it =



βW it−1 +
p (1− q)
1− p τAt with probability 1− p
βW it−1 + (1− τ )At with probability p (1− q)
βW it−1 + At with probability pq,
where, in the first line, p (1− p)−1 (1− q) τAt represents the transfer received by a single
unlucky family. By dividing all equations by At we get the productivity-adjusted dynamic
wit =



f1
¡
wit−1
¢
= αwit−1 +
p (1− q)
1− p τ w. pr. 1− p
f2
¡
wit−1
¢
= αwit−1 + (1− τ) w. pr. p (1− q)
f3
¡
wit−1
¢
= αwit−1 + 1 w. pr. pq,
(23)
where α = β/γ.
Note that system (23) contains three (affine) contractive maps identified by the parameters
α, p, q and τ , where the last two are decision variables for the government. We want to
investigate for what values of these parameters 1) incentive compatibility holds, that is, all
individuals exert effort et, 2) the three maps are ordered so that f1 < f2 < f3, and 3) whether
values of the parameters exist so that the image set of f2 fills the (possible) gap left by the
image sets of f1 and f3. The last point would mean the possibility of eliminating possible
polarization through government redistribution under this random scheme.
With no loss of generality for the rest of this section we shall assume
1
3
≤ α < 1
2
,
which implies that the two maps IFS (3) exhibits polarization (the images of the two normal-
ized maps do not overlap), and by adding one third affine map with slope α exactly between
the two given maps the hole left by the two images sets may be "filled". From the first plot in
figure 3, it is easily understood that maps with slope α < 1/3 have images sets which cannot
fill the whole interval [0, 1]. Clearly, for maps with α < 1/3, arguments similar to the one
carried out in this section can be implemented for random taxation schemes that use more tax
rates. For example, if α < 1/n, n− 1 tax rates, each with positive probability, are necessary.
In order to let all individuals keep putting effort et even under taxation, an upper bound
on the tax rate τ similar to that in Assumption A.2 is needed. An argument similar to that
in Section 3.3, with the certain tax rate suitable replaced by the expected rate tax (1− q) τ ,
leads to the following inequality:
τ < 1− p
1− q
µ
1− e0pρA0
¶
,
where ρ = (1− β)1−β ββ. Moreover, in order to have f1 < f2, it is immediately seen that
τ 2 <
1− p
1− pq
must hold; while f2 < f3 follows from 0 < τ < 1. Hence, the following assumption is what we
need.
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A. 3 Assumption A.1 holds and
0 < τ < min
½
1− p
1− q
µ
1− e0pρA0
¶
, 1− p
1− pq
¾
,
where ρ = (1− β)1−β ββ.
To analyze the possibility of eliminating polarization, let us normalize system (23) to the
interval [0, 1]. We shall apply formula (44) of Section 6.1 using as fixed points a and b the
fixed points of the maps f1 and f3, that is,
a = p (1− q) τ
(1− p) (1− α) , b =
1
1− α,
and therefore
k = b− a = (1− p)− p (1− q) τ
(1− p) (1− α) .
By construction, we get the normalized system
wit =



g1
¡
wit−1
¢
= αwit−1 w. prob. 1− p
g2
¡
wit−1
¢
= αwit−1 + (1− η) (1− α) w. prob. p (1− q)
g3
¡
wit−1
¢
= αwit−1 + (1− α) w. prob. pq,
(24)
where
η = (1− p) τ
(1− p)− p (1− q) τ .
Note that, under A.3, 0 < η < 1.
The overlapping condition for the three image sets is a straightforward computation that
leads to
1− 2α ≤ (1− α) η ≤ α,
which, in terms of τ , boils down to
(1− 2α) (1− p)
(1− p) (1− α) + (1− 2α) p (1− q) ≤ τ ≤
α (1− p)
(1− p) (1− α) + αp (1− q) . (25)
Note that condition (25) is nonempty for 1/3 ≤ α < 1/2, and coincides with a single value
for τ when α = 1/3, that is when inequalities in (25) become equalities and there is only one
map g2 in (24) with image set that can fill the hole left by the other two.
The left hand side of condition (25) is the most important in our analysis: it requires τ to
be large enough in order to eliminate polarization. However, in view of Assumption A.3, we
observe that τ must be not too large to let the incentive compatibility be satisfied:
τ ≤ 1− p
1− q
µ
1− e0pρA0
¶
must be fulfilled to let all individuals exert effort et. If this constraint is too tight, due,
e. g., to a high value of the ratio e0/pρA0, the left hand side in (25) might not hold, thus
leaving the government with no room for applying redistributive policies against polarization8.
8Note that the other component of assumption A.3 is always satisfied since
(1− 2α) (1− p)
(1− p) (1− α) + (1− 2α) p (1− q) <
1− p
1− pq
is always true.
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Specifically, polarization is neglected if τ is chosen to be equal to the left hand side of (25)
and
e0
pρA0
< 1− (1− 2α) (1− q)
(1− p) (1− α) + (1− 2α) p (1− q) (26)
holds.
Note that we did not discuss any restrictions for the choice of parameter q by the govern-
ment so far. Since by Assumption A.1 e0/pρA0 < 1, there always exist values for parameter
q < 1, possibly close to 1, such that (26) is satisfied. In other words, there is always room for
the government to eliminate polarization through a random taxation and lump-sum redistri-
bution scheme in the sense of making the support of the steady state distribution of system
(24) to be the whole interval [0, 1]. However, values of q close to 1 imply that almost the whole
p fraction of the steady state successful population - that is, pq out of p - is paying no taxes,
while only a negligible fraction p (1− q) of the successful population - which is the “middle
class” artificially created through the random taxation - is paying taxes. This means that,
from the probabilistic point of view, polarization remains substantially unaltered, since the
rich individuals are almost of the same size as before and the new middle class carries nearly
no weight. That is, once again, a tight incentive compatibility constraint in Assumption A.3
leaves little room for government intervention and substantially reduces hopes of eliminating
polarization even through random taxation.
4 Patents and Firms
In this section we show that the main results of the previous section are easily applied to
slightly different models, and do not hinge on the assumption that unlucky people should earn
zero income, unless sustained by redistributive policies. We will show that even if they can
reap the benefits of technological advance with a one period lag, a strong enough growth rate
is able to generate a fractal society.
While keeping the same framework of Section 3, let us now assume that every individual
of generation t at the beginning of her economic life has the same probability 0 < p < 1 of
discovering a better production method that allows the productivity of a number θ ≥ 1 of
individuals, including herself, to jump to the new technological frontier At = γAt−1, provided
she undertook an indivisible innovation effort et = γet−1.
To render growth endogenous we will assume that productivity growth rate γ is an in-
creasing and bounded9 function of the aggregate innovative effort
R L
0
ei0di, where L denotes
the constant population size10.
Inventions are immediately patented and the patents expire after a generation. We will
assume that each individual can run only one research project during her life. Hence we are
building a simple Schumpeterian model in which the entrepreneurs are new people (Schumpeter
[42] and [43]) who try to adapt the ever-evolving society knowledge frontier (as in Aghion and
Howitt [2], Ch. 3, and Howitt [29]) to their sphere of production. The parallel with Aghion
and Howitt ([2], Ch. 3) and Howitt [29] cross-sector spillover is in our assumption that At
evolves as an increasing function of social R&D adoption effort. This adds a zero growth
equilibrium due to R&D coordination failure: if each individual expects nobody to exert effort
9With this simple assumption - that may be motivated by some kinds of congestion effects - we eliminate
Jones [31] scale effects.
10It would not be difficult to allow for population growth. Interestingly, offspring’s division of bequest would
re-inforce fractalization effects in this model and/or even generate it.
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she will be better off not exerting it. In the rest of the analysis we will concentrate only on
the positive growth equilibrium.
Unlike usual Schumpeterian models we are here assuming a limited productive capacity
per-firms and/or a limited number of patent licensees. In fact we will assume that in order to
implement each successful innovation the cooperation of θ workers (including the innovator)
is necessary. Hence, by the law of large numbers, in the steady state there will be a fraction p
of innovators, and a fraction pθ of individuals employed in all innovative productive processes.
Since we keep the whole population normalized to the interval [0, 1], in order to let all inno-
vators carry on their activity, the fraction pθ of employed individuals cannot exceed L = 1,
that is, the number of workers for each activity must be bounded by
1 ≤ θ ≤ 1p. (27)
If the right hand side of (27) holds with equality, the society is perfectly divided in a
fraction p of entrepreneurs/ innovators and a fraction 1− p of workers. If the right hand side
of (27) holds with strict inequality, then there will be a fraction of people who will be treated
as self-employed in production processes that use the technology At−1 available from the last
period. Since patents expire after one period, the technology At−1, available only for the
innovators at time t− 1, becomes of public domain at time t. Therefore we shall assume that,
at each period t, both employed workers in the innovative sectors and self-employed workers in
the old sectors perceive salaries equal to their productivity under the old technology At−1. In
this last case there will be a fraction 0 < pθ < 1 of individuals employed in the At technology
sector and a fraction 1 − pθ of individuals employed in the At−1 technology sector. Of these
families, only a fraction p is able to reap the benefits of the innovative technology At (each
by employing θ − 1 workers) by means of patents, while the other fraction 1− p, being them
employed in the innovative sector or self-employed in the old sector, is remunerated by the
productivity of the At−1 technology11.
The innovations of this model can alternatively be interpreted as the discovery of an
”entrepreneurial talent” that allows the innovator to found a firm that allows a more efficient
use of θ workers by making them use the best productive practices available in her firm. In
this sense, the model of this section can be viewed as an education model of the firm: in the
particular case θ = 1 the individual is only able to privately accumulate the ”state of the art”
human capital. Unlike the previous example, the technology learned by generation t will be
observed by everybody when it is operated, and, afterwards, every family will become able to
use it at no additional educational cost. With θ = 1 this model depicts an economy similar
to that of the previous example, except for a perfect educational spillover which allows the
wealth of the children of the unlucky generation to instantaneously reach the level of the lucky
members of the previous cohort.
4.1 Fractalization of Schumpeterian Growth
To summarize, in every period p ”innovators” will appear and pθ ≤ 1 skilled workers will be
producing with the cutting-edge technology, paying their extra productivity to each successful
innovator. The innovator - as a patent holder or as an entrepreneur - is able to extract the
complete productivity increment for one period, thereby rendering the appropriable technology
11If θ > 1/p, the innovators would not be able to implement their discoveries, and in a competitive equilib-
rium all profits would be zero, leading to a society with a unique wealth group and no polarization.
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of every non-innovator equal to the same value At−1. In other words, each single innovator in
period t can appropriate the productivity gains of the non-innovators, equal to
(At − At−1) (θ − 1) = (γ − 1) (θ − 1)At−1. (28)
Hence, the wealth of family i at the end of period t, provided she undertook the indivisible
innovation effort et at the beginning of the period, will be
W it =
½
βW it−1 + At−1 with probability 1− p
βW it−1 + At + (γ − 1) (θ − 1)At−1 with probability p.
(29)
Notice that the successful innovator, through the patent, benefits from both the adoption of
the new technology At and the productivity gain of the θ−1 non-innovators workers employed
in her firm; that is, each non-innovator employed in her firm has to pay the full monopolistic
rent to the patent holder, though she can choose between alternative patent holders. On the
other side, the unlucky will get only the one-period lagged productivity At−1 wealth, being
her employed by some patent holder firm or self-employed. Notice that we are focussing on
perfectly symmetric equilibria.
Once again, we need to make sure that all families find it convenient to undertake the
indivisible innovation effort et at the beginning of each period t. The individual i expected
utility gain conditional on effort et is given by
E [U (Y it ) |et] = pρ [At + (γ − 1) (θ − 1)At−1] + (1− p) ρAt−1 − et
= ρ [1 + pθ (γ − 1)]At−1 − et,
where ρ = (1− β)1−β ββ, while the individual i certain utility gain obtained by exerting zero
effort is given by
U (At−1) = ρAt−1.
To achieve our goal,
E
£
U
¡
Y it
¢ |et¤ > U (At−1)
must hold, which easily translates into the next assumption.
A. 4
0 < e0 < ρθ (1− 1/γ) pA0.
where ρ = (1− β)1−β ββ.
A result similar to the previous ones follows.
Proposition 5 Assume condition (27) and assumption A.4 to hold. Then, if 1 < γ ≤ 2β,
there exists a middle class. Whenever γ > 2β the economy becomes polarized/ pulverized in
the long run, and the support A of its limit distribution µ∗ is a Cantor-like set. Moreover, the
larger γ (and the smaller β), the larger the gap between the fractions of the population near
the extremes of the support, independently of the values of parameters p and θ.
Proof. Following the usual technique, divide both equations in (29) by At to get the
productivity-adjusted dynamic
wit =
½
(β/γ)wit−1 + 1/γ with probability 1− p
(β/γ)wit−1 + 1/γ + (1− 1/γ) θ with probability p.
(30)
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Clearly, under A.4, Proposition 1 holds, and thus system (30) is similar to system (18). By
Proposition 2, polarization/ pulverization is completely determined by condition γ > 2β.
Notice that in this case nobody ends up with a zero wealth, but instead even the ”poorest”
segment of the population improves its standards of living at the same steady rate γ − 1 as
the richest. In particular, the true support of the marginal distribution of system (29) at time
t lay in some subset of the interval"Ã
1− (β/γ)t+1
γ − β
!
γtA0 ,
Ã
1− (β/γ)t+1
γ − β
!
γt [1 + (γ − 1) θ]A0
#
.
This is a consequence of the temporary nature of patents that allows the inventors to ”exploit”
the unlucky only for a limited lapse of time and, upon expiry, makes that innovation available
for everybody to be freely used.
Also notice that here larger population size implies faster growth (higher γ): therefore a
more populated world or a more globalized economic space can generate or enhance fractal-
ization.
In light of Section 3.3, it would be natural to believe that a policy that ”cures” polarization/
pulverization is possible, provided the effort et required to promote innovation is sufficiently
small. The government could, in fact, reward the innovator and at the same time make
the innovation immediately publicly available to everybody. We show that again, also in an
economy with patented discoveries, government intervention proves ineffective in modifying
possible polarization.
4.2 Government Purchase of Innovations
Under the normalization that the population is indexed in [0, 1], the society as a whole will
put effort et in the R&D for new technological projects and at the steady state there will be a
fraction p of successful innovators who possess technology At. Suppose that the government,
in order to make technology At publicly available in period t, buys the technological know-how
from the p fraction of innovators at the lowest incentive compatible price (i.e. at12 p−1et) and
allows the fraction 1−p of unluckies to freely use it in their own firms. At first sight one could
expect such policy to eliminate wealth fractalization.
Assume that the government charge all the unluckies the whole cost et of research through
a lump-sum tax to be fully transferred to the luckies. The law of motion of wealth becomes:
W it =
½
βW it−1 + At − (1− p)
−1 et with probability 1− p
βW it−1 + At + p−1et with probability p,
(31)
where (1− p)−1 et denotes the per capita cost of research charged to the unluckies and p−1et
denotes the per capita compensation for the productivity gain loss (28). We will assume e0
small enough to guarantee that the unluckies are better off under this forced purchase of the
new technology than under laissez faire.
Observe that, at least for the case p < 1/2, which seems sufficiently realistic, system (31)
can once again be reduced to system (18) by Proposition 1. Therefore Proposition 2 applies
stating that polarization/ pulverization is completely determined by condition γ > 2β, thus
12Note that any price slightly higher than p−1et makes each individual strictly better off undertaking the
R&D effort.
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obtaining a result similar to Proposition 5: government financing private innovations does not
affect polarization/ pulverization.
The delicate part, as usual, is enforceability of such a policy: nobody would vote a govern-
ment who leaves everybody worse off under this program. The individual expected indirect
utility gain is
E
£
U
¡
Y it
¢¤
= ρ
·
p
µ
At +
et
p
¶
+ (1− p)
µ
At −
et
1− p
¶¸
− et
= ρpAt − et,
and thus, the effort condition turns out to be the same as13 in Assumption A.1:
e0 < ρpA0. (32)
Note that, by assuming p < 1/2, necessarily ρp < 1−p, and thus (32) implies e0 < (1− p)A0,
which guarantees that the infimum of the support of the marginal probabilities of process (31),
which at time t is Ã
1− (β/γ)t+1
γ − β
!
γt+1
µ
A0 −
e0
1− p
¶
,
is strictly positive for all t. This means that, like in Proposition 5, the ”poorest” segment of
the population improves its standards of living at the same steady rate γ − 1 as the richest.
5 Polarization Versus Pulverization
So far we have used the term polarization to generically describe the disappearance of the
middle class in a distribution supported on a Cantor set. In a recent work Esteban and Ray
[23] provided a more refined concept of polarization and constructed a measure of polarization
based on an axiomatic approach. Their measure of polarization compares the homogeneity
of a group with the overall heterogeneity of a population. If the distribution of wealth is
highly gathered within groups but very diverse between groups in a population, then wealth
is considered “polarized” between the groups. The fundamental difference of such measure
with standard measures of inequality, such as the Gini coefficient or any Lorenz consistent
index, is that the latter fails to capture the "sense of identity" within members of the same
group, while the former includes a sensitivity parameter which takes it into account. The
idea behind adding some identification function into a inequality measure is that polarization
increases not only as inter-group heterogeneity raises, but also when the number of members
within a group raises. In other words, the generation of tensions possibly evolving to rebellion,
revolt, or social unrest is more likely if wealth is distributed among groups which have a strong
self-identity feeling.
Formally, given a finite distribution of weights π1, . . . , πn on wealths14 W1, . . . ,Wn, with
πi,Wi > 0, the polarization measure is given by
Pn = K
nX
i=1
nX
j=1
π1+λi πj |Wi −Wj| , (33)
13This seems to be reasonable since utility is linear and what is taken from the unluckies goes to the luckies,
leaving the expected utility gain unchanged.
14To be precise, the authors interpret the Wi’s as the natural logarithm of wealths. This is based on the
assumption that only percentage differences matter. We shall take into account log transformations of wealths
at the end of this section.
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where K > 0 is a constant used for population normalization and 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1.6 indicates the
degree of self-identity within each group i - that is, the degree of polarization sensitivity - by
raising to a non-negative power the frequency associated to wealth Wi. Note that for λ = 0
Pn boils down to the Gini coefficient.
The measure defined in (33) has been constructed for statistical purposes; it is meant to
measure polarization by using statistical data available for societies with finite populations.
The pursue of some generalization of the measure (33) to include infinite distributions sup-
ported over fractal sets is well beyond the scope of this paper. In this section, however, we
try to estimate the limit of Pn as n→∞ in some cases. Of course this is a very coarse mea-
sure of polarization for infinite distributions, and it is certainly not based on any axiomatic
justification.
Our goal is actually more modest: we plan to use such a rough measure of polarization
to investigate how what we called "pulverization" - that is, the replica of the "polarization"
on a smaller scale within each sub-interval generated after each iteration of the IFS (14)
when 2β < γ - affects polarization in the long run. The question is non trivial in view of
formula (33), since it is not clear whether the process of removing a middle interval from
each sub-interval after iterations of the Markov operator M will eventually reduce or increase
the striking polarization phenomena occurring after the first iteration of the IFS (see, e.g.,
the first plot in figure 4). Two opposite effects occur by applying formula (33) directly to
our IFS after each step: on one hand new wealth groups Wi are born and, at least in the
original model not normalized over the interval [0, 1], the distances between wealth clusters
increase, thus raising the number of terms in the sum and also raising the values |Wi −Wj|;
on the other hands, the weights πi decrease after each step, since, under our assumptions, the
same constant population is progressively fractionalized over more and more wealth clusters.
Moreover, since in our model the population is normalized on [0, 1], the weights πi are always
less than 1; this further reduces the "polarization effect" due to the exponent λ ≥ 0, which
has been introduced to enhance the importance of large groups, but, when πi < 1, has the
opposite effect that the Gini inequality index turns out to be larger than the polarization
measure. This seems to be coherent with the theoretical goals of formula (33): small groups
have low self- identity, thus reducing polarization. In our specific model, all the weights πi
become eventually negligible on the support of the invariant distribution, which is nonatomic
indeed.
All these considerations raise the question of whether our choice of describing polarization
and pulverization as if they were different aspects of the same phenomenon so far, might turn
out to be contradictory, as they may well be working one against the other. In other words,
the aim of the present section is to figure out whether the growth of the terms |Wi −Wj|, both
in number and in size, dominates the shrinking of terms π1+λi πj in formula (33), as it is being
applied to the finite distributions of wealth obtained after each iteration of the dynamic (14).
This may shed some light on the polarization properties of the limit distribution of wealths.
This study, far from being complete, essentially shall provide some partial results for some
values of the parameters. This is however enough to envisage a variety of different polarization
features of the limit distribution. For values of the sensitivity parameter λ close to 0, economies
have infinite polarization in the long run even for low values of the growth rate γ. However,
for λ > 0, we are able to show that polarization may still be infinite, or at least positive, in
the limit with growth rates γ high enough; while, if γ is small, polarization vanishes as time
elapses. Finally, by following more closely Esteban and Ray [23] construction, we consider
logarithmic transformations of wealths instead of wealths themselves. In this last case, we
are able to show that, at least for p = 1/2, polarization becomes negligible for all γ > 1 and
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all λ > 0. This partial analysis is enough to convince the reader that pulverization does not
necessarily conflict with polarization in the long run. There is enough room for (feasible)
values of the parameters such that pulverization allows for increasing polarization through
time.
Consider the dynamic system (14) discussed in Section 3:
Wt =
½
βWt−1 with probability 1− p
βWt−1 + At with probability p,
(34)
where Wt denotes some wealth amount at time t, 0 < β < 1 is the degree of intergenerational
altruism, At = γtA0 is the exogenous technology with A0 > 0, γ > 1, and 0 < p < 1
represents the probability of ”success” in the adoption of the technology. Since we are studying
polarization, in the sequel we shall assume
2β < γ (35)
as prescribed by Proposition 2.
The choice of studying system (34) instead of system (18) normalized on the interval [0, 1] is
made to conform ourselves with the mainstream literature, where true wealth values available
from statistical data are used, instead of productivity adjusted values.
Theorem 1 cannot be applied directly to the IFS (34), which has unbounded support for
t→∞, however we can refer to the invariant distribution of the conjugate system (18) as the
equivalent of the unique invariant distribution of (34) defined on the positive real line15. The
system converges to this distribution starting from any initial distribution of wealths. Thus,
for convenience, we assume that the distribution at time t = 0 concentrates a mass 1 − p on
some bequest b0 ≥ 0 inherited from the past and a mass p on b0+A0; that is, µ0 = (1− p) δb0+
pδb0+A0 , where δW is the Dirac function. We may also write
W0 =
½
b0 with probability 1− p
b0 + A0 with probability p.
(36)
Having an initial distribution concentrating masses over a finite set of points implies that
also the distribution of wealths at each date t > 0 concentrates masses over finite sets of
points. This allows a direct application of formula (33) to the distribution of wealths at each
date t. By construction, it is easily seen that, for all t ≥ 0, the are 2t+1 values of wealth
W 1t , . . . ,W 2
t+1
t each with weight πit, which can be interpreted as the frequency of wealth W it ,
i = 1, . . . , 2t+1. Therefore, polarization at time t is given by
Pt =
2t+1X
i=1
2t+1X
j=1
¡
πit
¢1+λ πjt ¯¯W it −W jt ¯¯ , (37)
where the constant K in (33) has been set equal to 1, as population is already normalized in
our model.
Since, by independence, for all t ≥ 0, weights πit have the form
πit = phi (1− p)
t+1−hi , 0 ≤ hi ≤ t+ 1, 0 < p < 1,
15Alternatively, since 0 < β < 1, one may invoke Theorem 7.2 in Lasota [34] to prove existence and
uniqueness of the invariant distribution for IFS (34).
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clearly limt→∞ πit = 0, and thus also limt→∞ (πit)
1+λ πjt = 0. In other words, masses p and
1 − p initially concentrated on b0 and b0 + A0, are progressively spread over a set of points
that eventually converge to the support of the invariant distribution, which is a continuum of
points, thus vanishing in the limit.
Since both wealths W it and weights πit have a recursive formulation generated by dynamic
(34), it is convenient to write formula (37) in a form more suitable for direct handling.
Lemma 1 For each t ≥ 0, label the set of wealths so that they are ordered: W 1t < W 2t < · · · <
W 2t+1t . Then formula (37) can be rewritten as follows:
Pt =
2t+1−1X
j=1
2t+1X
i=1+j
πitπ
i−j
t
h¡
πit
¢λ
+
¡
πi−jt
¢λi ¡W it −W i−jt ¢ (38)
Proof. Note that in the sum (37) each difference
¯¯
W it −W
j
t
¯¯
is counted twice: once with
coefficient (πit)
1+λ πjt and once with coefficient πit
¡
πjt
¢1+λ
. By counting all possible distances
W it −W
j
t , withW it > W
j
t , starting from those between contiguous points W it −W
i−j
t for j = 1
and 2 ≤ i ≤ 2t+1, then adding those between points more apart, for 2 ≤ j ≤ 2t+1 − 1 and
1 + j ≤ i ≤ 2t+1, we get
Pt =
2t+1−1X
j=1
2t+1X
i=1+j
¡
πit
¢1+λ πi−jt ¡W it −W i−jt ¢+ 2t+1−1X
j=1
2t+1X
i=1+j
πit
¡
πi−jt
¢1+λ ¡W it −W i−jt ¢ ,
which is (38).
Formula (38) becomes especially appealing when λ = 0, since it allows for a recursive
formulation of polarization Pt as t increases, as the following lemma establishes.
Lemma 2 Let 2β < γ. Then, if λ = 0, polarization Pt has the following recursive formulation:
Pt+1 = [1− 2p (1− p)] βPt + 2p (1− p)At+1, t ≥ 0. (39)
Proof. First note that for λ = 0 (38) in Lemma 1 boils down to
Pt = 2
2t+1−1X
j=1
2t+1X
i=1+j
πitπ
i−j
t
¡
W it −W
i−j
t
¢
. (40)
Our plan is to write Pt+1 as a function of Pt. Recall that at time t, there are 2t+1 wealth
points that we order as follows: W 1t < W 2t < · · · < W 2t+1t . By following the dynamic (34),
each point W it , with associated weight πit, at time t is being split into the following two points
at time t+ 1: βW it with mass (1− p) πit and βW it +At+1 with mass pπit. Hence, it is possible
to write all 2t+2 wealth points and their associated mass at time t+ 1 in terms of wealths W it
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and weights πit at time t. By using (40) for t+ 1 we then obtain
Pt+1 = 2
2t+1−1X
j=1
2t+1X
i=1+j
(1− p)2 πitπ
i−j
t β
¡
W it −W
i−j
t
¢
+2
2t+1−1X
j=1
2t+1X
i=1+j
p2πitπ
i−j
t β
¡
W it −W
i−j
t
¢
+2
2t+1−1X
j=1
2t+1X
i=1+j
p (1− p)πitπ
i−j
t
¡
βW i−jt − βW it + At+1
¢
+2
2t+1−1X
j=1
2t+1X
i=1+j
p (1− p)πitπ
i−j
t
¡
βW it − βW
i−j
t + At+1
¢
+2
2t+1X
k=1
p (1− p)
¡
πkt
¢2At+1,
where in gathering the homogeneous terms in each of the 5 sums we have exploited the fact
that, under the polarization assumption (35) 2β < γ, βW 2t+1t < βW 1t + At+1. After some
algebra and by plugging (40) into the above expression we readily get equality (39).
Lemma 2 is the key in the proof of the next result which provides a very striking charac-
terization of the limit behavior of the pure inequality measure, that is when λ = 0.
Proposition 6 If λ = 0, Pt < Pt+1 for all t ≥ 0 and limt→∞ Pt =∞ for all feasible values of
parameters β, p, γ, b0 and A0 such that the polarization condition 2β < γ is satisfied.
Proof. Since P0 = 2p (1− p)A0 > 0, system (39) in Lemma 2 has solution
Pt = 2p (1− p)A0
1− (s/γ)t+1
γ − s γ
t+1, t ≥ 0,
where s = [1− 2p (1− p)] β. Since 0 < s < 1 and γ > 1, the result is established.
Proposition 6 states that pure inequality grows as time elapses in a polarized society16,
where polarization is characterized by Proposition 2. This is a non-trivial result since weights
πit vanish as t → ∞ already when λ = 0. Increasing inequality means that the distances¯¯
W it −W
j
t
¯¯
rise -both in number and in size - more rapidly than the speed at which weights
πit converge to 0.
Next result is aimed at investigating how the result in Proposition 6 is being modified as
we let sensitivity parameter λ having positive values. Since positive values of λ further reduce
the weights (πit)
1+λ πjt associated to each distance
¯¯
W it −W
j
t
¯¯
in the sum (37), we expect
that some stricter condition on parameters, other than polarization condition 2β < γ, might
become necessary in order to have positive polarization in the long run. Since in this case
formula (38) in Lemma 1 becomes much harder to handle, we shall focus on the special case
p = 1/2. This example, nevertheless, confirms our intuition.
16In view of the result in the following Proposition 7, which is independent of polarization condition (35), our
conjecture is that the Proposition 6 may hold also for non polarized economies, that is, also when 2β ≥ γ. In
this case the construction in Lemma 2 becomes more complicated since the difference
³
βW i−jt − βW it +At+1
´
in the third term of the expression of Pt+1 must be replaced with its absolute value. We did not investigate
further this case.
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Proposition 7 Let p = 1/2 and 0 < λ ≤ 1.6. Then,
lim
t→∞
Pt =



∞ if γ > 2λ
(2γ − 1)−1A0 if γ = 2λ
0 if γ < 2λ
Proof. If p = 1/2, πit = π
i−j
t = (1/2)
t+1 and
πitπ
i−j
t
h¡
πit
¢λ
+
¡
πi−jt
¢λi
= 2
µ
2−λ
4
¶t+1
.
Then (38) in Lemma 1 becomes
Pt = 2
µ
2−λ
4
¶t+1 2t+1−1X
j=1
2t+1X
i=1+j
¡
W it −W
i−j
t
¢
, t ≥ 0,
which boils down to
Pt = 2
µ
2−λ
4
¶t+1
(2γ/β)t+1 − 1
2γ − 1 2
tβt+1A0
=
A0
2γ − 1
"³ γ
2λ
´t+1
−
µ
β
2λ+1
¶t+1#
,
which, as γ > 1 and 0 < β < 1, yields the result.
Proposition 7 establishes a direct link between polarization and growth rate of the economy:
for all feasible values of sensitivity parameter 0 < λ ≤ 1.6, polarization may be strictly
positive (even infinity) in the long run provided that the exogenous growth rate γ is sufficiently
large. Moreover, for smaller values of λ, smaller values of γ are required for positive limit
polarization, with nearly all feasible values γ > 1 as λ approaches 0. Simulations on computer
support the conjecture that a generalization of Proposition 7 to cover all probability values 0 <
p < 1, providing some threshold function f (p) above which polarization diverges and below
which polarization vanishes, should hold. Note also that Proposition 7 holds independently of
polarization condition 2β < γ, as we do not use the construction of Lemma 2 in its proof. In
other words, if λ is small enough, the limit polarization might diverge even when 2β > γ.
Finally we turn to a slight modification of the polarization measure in (37) by considering
natural logarithms of wealths in place of wealths themselves. This is based on Esteban and
Ray [23] presumption that only percentage differences matter. Polarization at time t in our
model then is given by
P lt =
2t+1X
i=1
2t+1X
j=1
¡
πit
¢1+λ πjt ¯¯lnW it − lnW jt ¯¯ , (41)
where W it and W
j
t are generated by system (34). To let the expression in (41) be defined for
all t ≥ 0, we need to assume b0 > 0.
Since logarithms grow much slower than wealths themselves, in view of the previous results
that link positive limit polarization to high growth rates γ, we expect that the limit in (41) as
t→∞ will be zero in most cases. This intuition is supported by the following partial result,
which states that, at least when p = 1/2, polarization in the long run must be generically zero.
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Proposition 8 Let p = 1/2. Then, for all 0 < λ ≤ 1.6 limt→∞ P lt = 0.
Proof. If p = 1/2 it is immediately seen that
¡
πit
¢1+λ πjt =
"µ
1
2
¶t+1#2+λ
=
µ
1
2
¶2+λ "µ
1
2
¶2+λ#t
.
Therefore (41) becomes
P lt =
µ
1
2
¶2+λ "µ
1
2
¶2+λ#t 2t+1X
i=1
2t+1X
j=1
¯¯
lnW it − lnW
j
t
¯¯
.
Proof. If W it > W
j
t , by construction,
lnW it − lnW
j
t ≤ ln
"
βtb0 +
1− (β/γ)t+1
γ − β γ
t+1A0
#
− ln
¡
βtb0
¢
,
and thus, at each time t ≥ 0 and for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 2t+1,
¯¯
lnW it − lnW
j
t
¯¯
< ln
"
1 +
γA0
(γ − β) b0
µ
γ
β
¶t#
.
We then have the following upper bound for P lt :
P lt ≤
µ
1
2
¶λ "
4
µ
1
2
¶2+λ#t
ln
"
1 +
γA0
(γ − β) b0
µ
γ
β
¶t#
=
µ
1
2
¶λ "µ
1
2
¶λ#t
ln
"
1 +
γA0
(γ − β) b0
µ
γ
β
¶t#
.
The right hand side of the last inequality converges to zero for all λ > 0, and the proof is
complete.
Proposition 8 provides only a sufficient condition for zero limit polarization. However,
we have not been able to find any example of positive polarization in the long run with
logarithms of wealths. Furthermore, computer simulations seem to bear out the conjecture
that Proposition 8 might hold for all 0 < p < 1 and for λ = 0 as well.
6 Non-Linear Iterated Function Systems
In the remaining sections we briefly sketch some possible generalizations of the theory discussed
in Section 2 to non-linear IFS and to IFS with state-dependent probabilities. This is to
show how widespread is the potential of these tools in economic dynamics, especially when
polarization/pulverization phenomena are the main focus.
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6.1 Scaling Maps
Consider a pair of continuous, strictly increasing, contractive maps f1, f2 so that f1 < f2, and
let a and b be their fixed points respectively, that is, f1 (a) = a and f2 (b) = b, as in figure
6. Since Theorem 1 holds for any contractive IFS (see, e.g., [30], [24] or [33]), given any fixed
probability p, 0 < p < 1, the system
xt =
½
f1 (xt−1) with probability 1− p
f2 (xt−1) with probability p
(42)
converges weakly to some unique invariant probability concentrated over a support which is
some compact subset of the interval [a, b]. In other words, the portion of the maps f1, f2 which
is relevant in the long run is included in the square T in figure 6 (where the plots of f1 and f2
are bold).
1
2
1
2
f
f
g
gN
T
0
1
a
b
1 a b
 
Figure 6: normalization of two contractive maps f1, f2 over the unit square.
For any contractive maps f1, f2, such relevant region can be ”normalized” over the interval
[0, 1] (that is, the square T can be transformed into the square N in figure 6) by the following
two transformations:
1. by a rigid translation towards the origin, so that the fixed point a becomes the origin
itself, and
2. by scaling the whole system by a factor k = b− a.
The outcome of such transformation is a new IFS
xt =
½
g1 (xt−1) with probability 1− p
g2 (xt−1) with probability p
(43)
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where the maps gj are given by
gj (x) = k−1 [fj (kx+ a)− a] , j = 1, 2, (44)
with k = b − a. Figure 6 illustrates this translation/scaling procedure that transforms the
original relevant region T into the new ”normalized” relevant region N , which is the unit
square.
Such normalization can be generalized to maps f1 < f2 that are not necessarily increasing
and even not necessarily monotone17. The next Lemma provides a general technique for
calculating the extrema of the ”relevant” interval [a, b] containing the trapping region of system
(42) for any pair of contractive maps. Note that numbers a, b are needed to apply formula
(44).
Lemma 3 For j = 1, 2, let fj : [c, d]→ [c, d] (possibly with c = −∞ and/or d = +∞), so that
f1 (x) < f2 (x) and some constant 0 < αj < 1 exists such that |fj (x)− fj (y)| ≤ αj |x− y| for
all x, y ∈ [c, d]. Then, for any probability 0 < p < 1, the relevant interval [a, b] ⊆ [c, d] of the
IFS {f1, f2, p} has extrema satisfying
i) a = minx∈[a,b] f1 (x),
ii) b = maxx∈[a,b] f2 (x).
Proof. Denote by xj the (unique) fixed points of the maps fj, i.e. xj = fj (xj) for j = 1, 2.
First note that f1 < f2 implies x1 < x2 and the relevant interval [a, b] must contain the interval
[x1, x2]. Moreover, since fj are contractions, by starting from any point in [x1, x2] the system
cannot move too far from it; specifically, it is readily seen that the size of the relevant interval
must satisfy
b− a ≤ 1 + α
1− α (x2 − x1) (45)
where α = max {α1, α2}.
It remains to show that numbers a, b exist so that (i) and (ii) hold. Consider the sequence
{[an, bn]}∞n=0 of intervals with extrema defined recursively by
an+1 = min
x∈[an,bn]
f1 (x) and bn+1 = max
x∈[an,bn]
f2 (x) , with x1 ≤ a0 < b0 ≤ x2.
Since contractivity of fj’s implies continuity, the sequences {an}∞n=0 and {bn}∞n=0 are well
defined provided that an < bn for all n = 0, 1, . . .. To see this, note that a1 ≤ a0, as f1 (x) ≤ x
for all x ≥ x1; similarly, b1 ≥ b0. But [a0, b0] ⊆ [a1, b1] implies a2 ≤ a1 and b2 ≥ b1. Continuing
by induction, we observe that {[an, bn]}∞n=0 is a nested non-decreasing sequence of intervals
which, since each interval [an, bn] has length bounded by (45), converges to some interval [a, b],
with extrema clearly satisfying (i) and (ii).
17To be precise, at least in the study of polarization phenomena, also the contractivity property could be
relaxed somewhere in the ”relevant region” (the square T in figure 6). The only minimum requirement is that
the graphics of f1, f2 do not intersect inside this area and that the maps are contractions outside such area,
so that the system is being attracted to the interval [a, b] as time elapses. However, by relaxing contractivity,
Theorem 1 cannot be applied and a characterization of the steady state(s) of system (43) becomes harder.
Existence and uniqueness of invariant limiting distribution for non-contractive IFS will be discussed more
thoroughly in Section 7.
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Lemma 3 applies easily when maps fj are monotone. In this case, the maximum and the
minimum in conditions (i) and (ii) are reached on the extrema of interval [a, b] and the relevant
interval [a, b] coincides with the trapping region. For example, if they are both increasing a, b
coincide with the fixed points x1, x2 of the fj’s; if they are both decreasing, a, b are the unique
solution of the system ½
f1 (b) = a
f2 (a) = b
;
if f1 is increasing and f2 is decreasing, a = x1 and b = f2 (a); while if f1 is decreasing and f2
is increasing, b = x2 and a = f1 (b).
However, if maps fj are not monotone, the trapping region in general will be some (proper)
subset of [a, b], as can be easily grasped by thinking of two unimodal maps reaching the
maximum and the minimum point respectively somewhere in the middle of interval [a, b], but
with (disjoint) image sets f1 ([a, b]) and f2 ([a, b]) sufficiently apart one from the other, so that
no point in [a, b] is being mapped into argminx∈[a,b] f1 (x) or into argmaxx∈[a,b] f2 (x).
A few examples of general contractive non-linear maps f1 < f2 will be recalled in the next
section.
6.2 Cookie-Cutter Sets
As in the linear case, the attractor of a non-linear IFS of the type (43) is the whole interval
[0, 1] provided that the two image sets g1 ([0, 1]) and g2 ([0, 1]) overlap. In this case we shall
say that the invariant distribution has ”full support”. For our purposes, the non-overlapping
case looks more appealing.
When g1 ([0, 1])∩ g2 ([0, 1]) = ∅, a ”hole” appears after one iteration of the IFS, and this
gap will spread through the unit interval after successive iterations, in a fashion similar to that
in figure 3. By taking infinite iterations of the Barnsley operator associated to the IFS, the
attractor of the system turns out to be a set which is totally disconnected and topologically
equivalent to a Cantor-like set of the kind discussed in Section 2.2. However, now maps g1 and
g2 are non-linear, that is, they are not similarity maps in the sense of Section 2, and relative
distances between any two points in [0, 1] are modified through application of both maps. The
invariant set of the IFS (43) is a ”non-linear perturbation” of some Cantor-like set. The IFS is
termed cookie-cutter system and its invariant set is called cookie-cutter set. Such a set might
be thought as a ”distorted” Cantor set, which nevertheless is ”approximately self-similar”.
Chapter 4 in [25] makes precise the idea of a set being ”approximately self-similar” by
stating the principles of bounded variation and bounded distortion. Loosely speaking, these
principles say that ”any sufficiently small neighborhood of the attractor may be mapped onto
a large part of the set by a transformation that is not unduly distorting, and, conversely, the
whole set may be mapped into small neighborhoods of itself without too much distortion”.
The intuitive interpretation of these invariant sets as ”distorted” Cantor sets follows naturally,
and is well illustrated in figure 4.3, p. 65 in [25]. Chapter 5 in [25] further explores properties of
such invariant sets by establishing a formula to calculate their (fraction) Hausdorff dimension.
Examples of non-linear IFS generating cookie-cutter sets are easy to find in dynamical
systems textbooks. The natural approach is to consider the ”inverse” of a contractive IFS,
which is an expanding system, for it can usually be described by a unique map f . Let I1 and
I2 be disjoint closed subintervals of [0, 1] and f : I1 ∪ I2 → [0, 1] such that both I1 and I2 are
mapped bijectively onto [0, 1]. Assume that f is continuous and is expanding, i.e., there is
some constant α > 1 such that |f (x)− f (y)| ≥ α |x− y| for all x, y ∈ Ij, j = 1, 2. Examples
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of this type are often constructed by taking the restriction to [0, 1] of a unimodal function, like
the logistic map f (x) = rx (1− x), for r > 2 +
√
5, or the tent map f (x) = r (1− |2x− 1|),
for r > 1, as in figure 7.
Since the system is expanding, we are interested in the invariant set A of the system: the
set of points that remain in I1 ∪ I2 under iteration by f . Such set turns out to be compact
and non-empty and satisfies
f (A) = A = f−1 (A) , (46)
where f−1 (X) denotes the pre-image of any set X under f . The invariant set A is a repeller,
in the sense that x ∈ A if and only if x ∈ f (A) and points outside A eventually move outside
I1 ∪ I2 under iteration by f .
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Figure 7: examples of expanding systems: a) the logistic map f(x) = (17/4)x(1 − x); b) the tent
map f(x) = (3/2)(1− |2x− 1|).
As a matter of fact, the invariant set A can be seen as the attractor of the contractive
IFS which is the inverse of the expanding system represented by f . Define gj : [0, 1]→ [0, 1],
j = 1, 2, as the two branches of the inverse of f :
g1 (x) = f−1 (x) ∩ I1
g2 (x) = f−1 (x) ∩ I2
36
Hence, g1 and g2 map [0, 1] bijectively onto I1 and I2 respectively18. Since |f (x)− f (y)| ≥
α |x− y| for all x, y ∈ Ij, j = 1, 2, and for some α > 1, it follows that the inverse functions g1,
g2 are Lipschitz, both with Lipschitz constant α−1 < 1: |gj (x)− gj (y)| ≤ α−1 |x− y|, j = 1, 2.
Thus they are contractions on [0, 1] and for all probabilities 0 < p < 1 the IFS {g1, g2, p} has
a unique compact set A ⊂ [0, 1] satisfying A = g1(A) ∪ g2(A) as attractor, which, thanks to
(46), turns out to be the repeller of f .
The maps g1, g2 in case (b) of figure 7 are peculiar since they are linear: g1 (x) = (1/3)x
and g2 (x) = 1− (1/3) x. As a matter of fact, their IFS is equivalent to system (5) for α = 1/3
(the only difference is the sign of monotonicity of g2), and it converges to an attractor which
is the Cantor ternary set discussed in Section 2.2.
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Figure 8: the relevant region of the IFS associated to f1 = (4/15)x1/3 and f2 = (2/15)x1/3.
It is also interesting to remark that the policy of the representative-agent optimal growth
model tackled in [36] falls in the category of non-linear IFS, as it has the form
f1 (x) = αβrxα
f2 (x) = αβxα
(47)
where 0 < α < 1 is the parameter of the Cobb-Douglas production function G (x) = xα,
0 < β < 1 is the discount factor and 0 < r < 1 represents an exogenous technological
perturbation that may occur with probability 1 − p. In that paper, this non-linear IFS is
being ”linearized” into one of the type (5) thanks to a log-linear transformation, and it is
normalized over the interval [0, 1] by applying formula (44). Hence, system (5) converging to
some Cantor-like attractor is studied for values α < 1/2. However, the true support of the
invariant probability to which the economy converges in the long run is the Cookie-Cutter
set obtained by an exponential transformation of the Cantor-like set, i.e., it is a ”distorted”
18In figure 7 (a), g1 and g2 are the inverse of the restrictions of the logistic map f (x) = (17/4)x (1− x) to
the intervals [0, 0.38] and [0.62, 1]; while in figure 7 (b), g1 and g2 are the inverse of the restrictions of the tent
map f (x) = (3/2) (1− |2x− 1|) to the intervals [0, 1/3] and [2/3, 1].
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Cantor set. Figure 8 shows the (true) relevant portion, included in the square T determined
by the two fixed points b ' 0.138 and a ' 0.049 of the maps f1, f2, of the optimal dynamics
(47) for α = 1/3, β = 4/5 and r = 1/2. The trapping region is the interval [0.049, 0.138]
(bold on the horizontal axis), and the two maps f1, f2, have disjoint image sets, the intervals
I1 = [0.049, 0.069] and I2 = [0.097, 0.138] (bold on the vertical axis) having different length.
Thanks to the log-linearization and normalization over the unit interval, it is immediately
seen that the occurrence of non-overlapping image sets in system (47) depends exclusively on
parameter α (which must be less than 1/2 to have a Cantor-like attractor), and not on other
parameters, like the discount factor β or the value of the exogenous shock r.
6.3 Polarization/Pulverization Generated by Non-Linear IFS
It is important to remark that, as it happened in our models of Section 3, the ”normaliza-
tion” procedure described in Section 6.1 points out what are the parameters truly affecting
the appearance of a fractal (possibly distorted) Cantor-like attractor. In Section 3 we have
shown that the only relevant parameters are the degree of intergenerational altruism β and
the exogenous growth rate γ. Any change in other aspects of the mode (like direct redistri-
bution from the luckies to the unluckies discussed in Section 3.3) does not modify the shape
of the attractor. We now generalize this result by providing sufficient conditions for polariza-
tion/pulverization and by extending the ineffectiveness of direct redistribution schemes to the
case of non-linear IFS.
Proposition 9 Let {f1, f2, p} be a non-linear contractive IFS with f1 < f2, and let [a, b] be
their relevant interval as defined in Lemma 3. Then, if
max
x∈[a,b]
f1 (x) < min
x∈[a,b]
f2 (x) (48)
the attractor of the IFS {f1, f2, p} is a cookie-cutter set (a ”distorted” Cantor-like set), and
so is the attractor of the normalized IFS {g1, g2, p} as in (43) obtained through formula (44).
Proof. The first part is obvious from the discussion in Section 6.2. Let us show that
condition (48) implies
max
x∈[0,1]
g1 (x) < min
x∈[0,1]
g2 (x) . (49)
Let y1 = maxx∈[a,b] f1 (x) and y2 = minx∈[a,b] f2 (x). Since by assumption y1 < y2, by formula
(44),
max
x∈[0,1]
g1 (x) = k−1y1 − a < k−1y2 − a = min
x∈[0,1]
g2 (x) ,
which proves the claim. Moreover, by reversing the argument, also (49) implies (48), thus
establishing that (48) holds if and only if (49) holds.
The following proposition relates the appearance of polarization/pulverization to the Lip-
schitz constants of the (contractive) maps f1, f2.
Proposition 10 Let {f1, f2, p} be a non-linear contractive IFS, with f1, f2 defined over some
interval I ⊆ R, such that f1 < f2. For j = 1, 2, let 0 < αj < 1 be such that |fj (x)− fj (y)| ≤
αj |x− y| for all x, y ∈ I. Then, if α1 + α2 < 1, the attractor of the IFS {f1, f2, p} is a
cookie-cutter set (a ”distorted” Cantor-like set).
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Proof. Consider the normalized IFS {g1, g2, p} as in (43) obtained by applying formula
(44) to {f1, f2, p}. It is immediately seen that the maps g1, g2 are Lipschitz with α1, α2 as
Lipschitz constants, since, for j = 1, 2,
|gj (x)− gj (y)| = k−1 |fj (kx+ a)− a− fj (ky + a) + a|
= k−1 |fj (kx+ a)− fj (ky + a)|
≤ k−1αj |kx+ a− ky − a|
= αj |x− y| ,
where k = b − a and b, a are the numbers provided by Lemma 3. Since the normalized IFS
{g1, g2, p} has the interval [0, 1] as trapping region andminx∈[0,1] g1 (x) = 0 andmaxx∈[0,1] g2 (x) =
1, it follows that maxx∈[0,1] g1 (x) ≤ α1 and minx∈[0,1] g2 (x) ≥ 1− α2; thus, maxx∈[0,1] g1 (x) <
minx∈[0,1] g2 (x) whenever α1 + α2 < 1. In this case, the image set g1([0, 1]) ∪ g2([0, 1]) is some
subset of [0, α1]∪[1− α2, 1], and has a ”gap” with amplitude larger or equals to 1−α1−α2 > 0.
This is enough to generate a cookie-cutter set as attractor.
Proposition 10 basically states that the nature of the attractor of a IFS depends on the
slope of the maps fj: if they are sufficiently flat, then polarization/pulverization occurs. This
observation leads to the next corollary, which generalizes Proposition 3 to the non-linear case.
Corollary 1 Let {f1, f2, p} be as in Proposition 10 with Lipschitz constants α1, α2. Any
transformation of the maps f1, f2 that does not modify their slope, do not affect the nature of
the attractor of the IFS. In particular, any additive transformation bf1 = f1 + z, bf2 = f2 − z,
with z < minx∈I (1/2) [f2 (x)− f1 (x)], does not affect relative distances between points of the
(possibly fractal) attractor of the IFS.
Proof. Since additive transformations bfj have the same Lipschitz constants αj of fj,
so have the ”normalized” maps gj : [0, 1] → [0, 1], for j = 1, 2, as shown in the proof of
Proposition 10. Hence, Proposition 10 states that relative distances between points of the
attractor of the IFS {f1, f2, p} depend only on Lipschitz constants α1, α2 and not on additive
constants.
The intuition behind this result is easily captured through the normalization argument of
Section 6.1: ”vertical” rigid translations of the maps f1, f2 are compensated by ”horizontal”
changes in the length of their trapping interval [a, b]. The simplest case is when f1, f2 are
affine maps (similarities), as in Sections 2 and 3: as a matter of fact, rigid translations of
affine maps leave the normalized IFS obtained through transformation (44) unaltered.
7 IFS with State-Dependent Probabilities
In the previous sections we have always assumed that the probability p of success, that is, the
probability that the system (43) jumps to position xt = g2 (xt−1) at time t given its position
xt−1 at time t − 1, is constant through time. Such assumption may appear too restrictive
in the context of wealth polarization with social mobility. It is in fact questionable that the
probability of success is the same for the rich and the poor; for example, the poor might find
educational costs unbearable or access to credit market precluded, thus indirectly reducing
their probability of success, while for the rich an easier access to education and credit markets
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improves their probability of being rich also in the future19. It seems reasonable to assume some
degree of monotonicity of the probability of success with respect to the wealth: a probability
of success p = p (x) which is (at least) non-decreasing in x could well represent this scenario.
Note that such assumption would introduce a "damping effect" on the dynamics of the models
described in Sections 3 and 4 with the consequence of curbing social mobility.
While we do not attempt to modify our models of Sections 3 and 4 by assuming, for
example, an individual utility effort et which depends on the wealth available at the beginning
of period t, or by introducing an educational cost, in this section we briefly discuss the case
in which the probability p of success at time t is allowed to depend on the state xt−1, i.e., in
terms of the models of Sections 3 and 4, on the wealth inherited from the ancestor. In view
of Section 6, a generic non-linear IFS {g1, g2, p (x)} normalized over [0, 1] with Lipschitz maps
gj : [0, 1] → [0, 1] and probability function p : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is considered. Thus, system (43)
can be rewritten as
xt =
½
g1 (xt−1) with probability 1− p (xt−1)
g2 (xt−1) with probability p (xt−1)
(50)
Such type of IFS is often called a learning system (see e.g. Karlin [32]), since the system
"learns" from position xt−1 a new strategy p (xt−1) for choosing the next stop.
It is immediately clear from the discussion in Section 2.2 that the geometric properties of
the attractor of system (50) does not depend on probability p (x), since the Barnsley operator
(6) is defined only by means of the maps gj, and is not affected by probabilities. In other
words, the polarization results of Section 6.3 remain unchanged: polarization/pulverization
appears as long as the image sets g1 ([0, 1]) and g2 ([0, 1]) do not overlap, and, if the Lipschitz
constants αj of maps gj are such that α1 + α2 < 1, any rigid vertical shift leaves the relative
shape of the attractor unaltered. This is important, since it implies that our main results
remain valid also for more general models with state-dependent probabilities.
However there is the delicate question of convergence of the marginal probabilities to
some (unique) invariant probability, independently of initial conditions, that must be tackled
carefully.
7.1 Invariant Distributions for IFS with State-dependent Probabil-
ities
Recall that Theorem 1 holds for a constant probability 0 < p < 1. To obtain an equivalent
Theorem for state-dependent probability p (x) some more assumptions, specifically on the
function p : [0, 1] → [0, 1], are required. They are summarized in the following Theorem. As
usual, let B be the σ-algebra of Borel measurable subsets of R and P the space of probability
measures on (R,B). Define the Markov operator M : P → P as
Mµ (B) =
Z
g−11 (B)
[1− p (x)]µ (dx) +
Z
g−12 (B)
p (x)µ (dx) , for all B ∈ B.
Successive iterations ofM starting from some initial probability µ0, µt (B) =M [M t−1µ0 (B)],
yield the evolution of marginal probabilities of the system as time elapses. As in Section 2.1,
we are interested in the limit limt→∞M tµ0 for any starting probability µ0.
19These observations suggest that models on wealth inequality from the traditional stream of research,
like the ones in Galor and Zeira [27] or in Aghion and Bolton [1] (see also the whole literature cited in
the introduction), which assume imperfect capital markets, may easily fit our framework with the necessary
modifications.
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Theorem 2 Assume that the IFS {g1, g2, p (x)} over [0, 1] satisfies the following:
i) for j = 1, 2, a constant αj > 0 (not necessarily less than 1) exists such that |gj (x)− gj (y)| ≤
αj |x− y| for all x, y ∈ [0, 1];
ii) a constant δ < 0 exists so that [1− p (x)] lnα1 + p (x) lnα2 ≤ δ for all x ∈ [0, 1];
iii) 0 < p (x) < 1 for all x ∈ [0, 1];
iv) a constant λ > 0 exist so that |p (x)− p (y)| ≤ λ |x− y| for all x, y ∈ [0, 1].
Then, there is a unique probability distribution µ∗ on ([0, 1] ,B ([0, 1])) satisfying the func-
tional equation
µ∗(B) =
Z
g−11 (B)
[1− p (x)]µ∗ (dx) +
Z
g−12 (B)
p (x)µ∗ (dx) for all B ∈ B ([0, 1])
which is supported on the attractor of the Barnsley operator (6), and, for any probability µ0
on ([0, 1] ,B ([0, 1])), the sequence µt =M t(µ0) converges weakly to µ∗.
A general proof for the theorem above has been first provided by Barnsley et al. [9].
A slightly modified proof can be found in [34]. See also [20] and [47] for recent surveys on
ergodic results for generalized IFS. It should be noted that Theorem 2 is a slightly simplified
version of the general theorems available from the mathematical literature cited above; some
assumptions can actually be weakened. For example, in [34] a similar results is given for Polish
state spaces which may be not (even locally) compact, and in [45] it is further extended to IFS
with a continuum of maps. Moreover, Lipschitz condition (iv) on probabilities it is usually
replaced by a weaker notion of Dini continuity20.
In Theorem 2 conditions (i) and (ii) generalize strict contractivity of maps gj that has been
assumed everywhere in the previous sections. Here the maps are still required to be Lipschitz
but the Lipschitz constants αj are allowed to be larger than 1. In fact, it has been shown
that what really matters is some "average contractivity" property of the type21 expressed by
condition (ii), which allows one of the gj’s to have slope larger than 1 on some subset of [0, 1]
(only one of the two on the same sub-interval, however). Note that, since Theorem 2 holds in
particular for a constant probability p (x) ≡ p, the assumption of strict contractivity of both
maps in Theorem 1 may be weakened and replaced by conditions (i) and (ii) of Theorem 2,
20We say that a probability vector (p1 (x) , . . . , pn (x)) satisfies the Dini condition if there is a continuous,
nondecreasing, concave function ϕ : R+ → R+ such that
nX
j=1
|pj (x)− pj (y)| ≤ ϕ (|x− y|) for all x, y
and Z 1
0
ϕ (t)
t dt <∞.
Such condition is more restrictive than continuity of functions pj , but less restrictive than Lipschitz (like our
condition (iv) in Theorem 2) or Hölder continuity. See, e.g., [34] for more details.
21Some authors, e.g. Lasota [34] and Stenflo [45], assume a slightly more restrictive "average contractivity"
property of the form
[1− p (x)]α1 + p (x)α2 < 1.
Clearly, by Jensen inequality, this is implied by condition (ii) in Theorem 2. See also Chapter 12 in [33].
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at least for the non-linear case discussed in the Section 6. That is, even if the slope of one
of the fj’s is larger than 1 somewhere in the relevant interval [a, b], which means αj > 1 for
some j ∈ {1, 2}, there is still weak convergence to a unique invariant probability independent
of initial conditions as long as (1− p) lnα1 + p lnα2 ≤ δ < 0. However we do not develop the
details here.
We already had a flavor of how difficult is to determine the complete nature of the invariant
probability µ∗ for i.i.d. IFS (i.e., with state-independent probabilities) in Section 2.3; of
course, letting probability p depend on the state of the process at each time cannot provide
any improvement. However, Barnsley et al. [9] proved that the "pure type" result still holds:
µ∗ is either singular or absolutely continuous on its whole support.
It is interesting to see what happens if some of the assumptions in Theorem 2 are relaxed.
In particular, removing condition (iii) (but this is not the only way, see, e.g., [46]), will in
general lead to the appearance of more than one distinct invariant probability dependent on
the initial condition. That is, conditions (iii) and (iv) of Theorem 2 guarantee uniqueness of
the invariant probability µ∗. We conclude this section with an example where condition (iii)
is relaxed, and which yields an interesting economic interpretation when applied to the model
of Section 3.
7.2 An Example of a (a.s.) Totally Polarized Economy
Consider system (50) with g1 (x) = αx, g2 (x) = αx + (1− α) for 0 < α < 1, and p (x) = x.
Clearly, the probability function does not satisfy (iii) in Theorem . Hence, it is easily seen
that the IFS has two invariant probabilities: the Dirac measure δ0 (x) concentrated fully on
x = 0 and the Dirac measure δ1 (x) concentrated fully on x = 1 (see Karlin [32]). If the initial
position is x0 = 0 (that is, if the initial marginal probability is µ0 = δ0 itself), then the system
remains at the same position forever, while if the initial position is x0 = 1 (or µ0 = δ1), then
the system is trapped at xt = 1 for all t. For all other starting points 0 < x0 < 1, the system
eventually is being attracted (with probability 1) into one of the absorbing states x = 0 or
x = 1, with an initial probability to hit x = 1 which is an increasing function of x0.
We now apply this example to our model developed in Section 3. Probability p (x) = x, the
probability of success, is an increasing function of the (productivity adjusted and normalized)
wealth, hence it does make sense from the economic point of view. As time goes to infinity,
whatever the initial distribution the whole population is being eventually trapped into these
two absorbing states. The society ends up into two wealth clusters, “totally polarized” at the
extrema of interval [0, 1]. It is important to observe that x = 0 and x = 1 are absorbing states
for all 0 < α < 1; hence, the society in the long run becomes divided into two groups, the
"completely derelict" and the "super rich" also for α > 1/2, namely, also when the attractor
of the Barnsley operator (6) is the full interval [0, 1], and thus, with a probability function
satisfying (iii) of Theorem 2, one would expect an invariant probability spread over all [0, 1].
Therefore, the polarization obtained through state-dependent probabilities in this extreme
example is independent of the results related to the geometrical properties of the attractor
discussed in the previous sections.
The weight of the two groups polarized at x = 0 and x = 1 depend, of course, on the initial
distribution of wealth. Recall, however, that, in order to let every individual put the required
effort into learning the new technology, some assumption equivalent to A.1 must hold. By
assuming e0 > 0, from A.1 we get
p (x) = x > e0ρA0
= m
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where ρ = (1− β)1−β ββ, which implies that all individuals starting with wealth x0 ∈ [0,m]
will not undertake any effort and thus they will eventually go to swell the group of the (com-
pletely) poor with certainty; while the model in Section 3 should be be re-normalized over
the individuals with initial (productivity adjusted and normalized) wealth x0 ∈ [m, 1]. In
other words, the group of the poor will always have strictly positive mass, whenever there is
a strictly positive mass of individuals with initial wealth x0 ≤ m.
Finally, observe that whenever we replace p (x) = x with any Lipschitz increasing function
p (x) such that p(0) = 0 and p (1) < 1, x = 0 is the unique absorbing state, and, with
probability one, eventually the whole society extinguishes with all individuals totally poor,
regardless of the value 0 < α < 1.
8 Conclusions
In this paper we have pointed out how wealth polarization/ pulverization is not to be con-
trasted with socioeconomic mobility, but that instead it can be the effect of a very strong
mobility of the individuals.
We have also shown that the existence of a middle class and, more generally, of a non polar-
ized wealth distribution and a non-disconnected society can be the result of a slowly growing
economy with little fiscal intervention. What really matters for polarization/ pulverization is
the reward from being successful, which is increasing in the size of the technological jump.
Private investment in the human capital necessary to adopt an exogenous innovation stream
can be a cause of a ”fractal society”. The private investment in research aimed at improving
everybody’s productivity can be another cause. Both the risky adoption of an exogenous
innovation stream and the risky development of innovations can have the same consequences
on the support of the limit distribution of productivity adjusted individual wealths. Despite
the differences between these two engines of growth, they generate fractal distribution support
and polarization if and only if the implied growth rate of the economy is higher than a common
threshold.
We have shown that in our successive generations framework polarization and pulverization
cannot be eliminated by fiscal measures such as wealth redistribution through taxation of
the successful people with equally rebated tax revenues, while taxation can even create the
fractalization of society. Also a random taxation scheme is substantially incapable of reducing
polarization, at least if the incentive compatibility constraint is tight enough. As a general
result we can say that in the examples of this paper redistribution is unable to eliminate
socioeconomic disconnection and that it can even increase it.
Finally, we have briefly illustrated how the study of dynamics in stochastic economies by
means of IFS can be generalized to models evolving through non-linear maps, also with associ-
ated probabilities which are state-dependent. Sufficient conditions for polarization/pulverization
are available also for economies exhibiting these generalized dynamics. We plan, in a future
paper, to extend our main results to models with infinitely lived agents.
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